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F. Andrew Hessick 
ABSTRACT—Federal courts have long recognized their power under Article 
III to award prospective relief, such as an injunction, to prevent a threatened 
injury. But the Supreme Court has refused to recognize Article III standing 
for some claims of threatened injury. Based on the concern that extending 
standing so broadly would threaten separation of powers, the Court has held 
that a plaintiff has standing to challenge a threatened injury only if the risk 
of harm is real and the threatened harm is imminent. This Article challenges 
that doctrine. It argues that Article III does not create a threshold of risk for 
potential harms. Contrary to the Court’s view, imposing such a threshold 
actually undermines the powers of both the courts and Congress. It also 
results in incoherent and unpredictable decisions because difficulties in 
applying the doctrine lead courts to base their decisions not on the actual 
likelihood of injury, but instead on other considerations, such as separation 
of powers and the fitness of the case for review. Nevertheless, recognizing 
that there may be reasons not to adjudicate particular claims alleging small 
risks of harm, this Article recommends that courts develop a prudential 
doctrine under which they may abstain from hearing such claims. Replacing 
the blanket prohibition on all low-risk claims with this prudential approach 
would produce a more coherent body of law and would promote both 
transparency and better decisionmaking by requiring courts to articulate the 
actual reasons for their decisions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Courts cannot decide legal questions in the abstract based on 
hypothetical disputes.1 As the Supreme Court has told us, the case-or-
controversy requirement of Article III limits the federal judiciary to 
resolving legal questions only in the context of redressing or preventing an 
“actual” or threatened injury resulting from violations of the law.2 To hear 
 
1
  See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) (“If a dispute is not a proper case or 
controversy, the courts have no business deciding it, or expounding the law in the course of doing so.”); 
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240–41 (1937) (“The controversy must be definite and 
concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.”). The Supreme Court has 
also said that Article III imposes other limitations, such as a requirement that the dispute must be of the 
sort traditionally heard by the courts. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 
(1998); GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 445 U.S. 375, 382 (1980) (stating that federal 
courts may resolve legal questions only when “presented in an adversary context and in a form 
historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process” (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 
U.S. 83, 95 (1968)) (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
2
  Alvarez v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 576, 580 (2009) (“The Constitution permits this Court to decide legal 
questions only in the context of actual ‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2)); 
Cuno, 547 U.S. at 341 (“[N]o principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system 
of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or 
controversies.” (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
see also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492 (2009) (stating that “courts have no charter to 
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claims based merely on a hypothetical, the Court has explained, would 
unduly expand the judiciary’s role by empowering it to address questions 
more properly reserved for the legislature or executive.3 
The concern about overexpansive federal judicial power has led to 
restrictions on jurisdiction over claims seeking prospective relief from 
threatened harms that have not yet taken place. Threatened future injuries 
are probabilistic; they might not occur. Based on the fear that recognizing 
jurisdiction for all injuries that have some probability of occurring—
however small—would effectively empower courts to hear hypothetical 
disputes, the Supreme Court has held that Article III authorizes federal 
courts to hear claims alleging future injury only when the threatened injury 
has a real chance of occurring.4 When the threat of injury is too speculative, 
that threat does not present a justiciable case under Article III. 
The Court has enforced this limitation through the doctrine of 
standing.5 To establish Article III standing in a suit brought to prevent a 
future injury, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they face a “real and 
immediate” threat of suffering an injury in fact because of the defendant’s 
conduct.6 
Although seemingly simple on its face, this doctrine has proven 
difficult to apply and has provoked substantial scholarly commentary.7 Over 
the years, determining when a claim is too remote or speculative to support 
standing has occupied substantial attention of the Supreme Court, perhaps 
 
review and revise legislative and executive action” except “when necessary in the execution of” 
deciding justiciable disputes). 
3
  See Cuno, 547 U.S. at 341 (stating that if courts could address all legal questions under the 
Constitution, “[t]he division of power [among the branches of government] could exist no longer, and 
the other departments would be swallowed up by the judiciary” (alterations in original) (quoting John 
Marshall, Speech Delivered in the House of Representatives of the United States on the Resolutions of 
the Hon. Edward Livingston (Mar. 7, 1800), in 4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 82, 95 (Charles T. 
Cullen ed., 1984)) (internal quotation mark omitted)).  
4
  See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102–06 (1983). 
5
  See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1814 (2010) (“To demonstrate standing, a plaintiff must 
have ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of 
federal-court jurisdiction.’” (quoting Horne v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2592 (2009))). In some older 
decisions, the Court relied on the restriction on advisory opinions. See United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 
330 U.S. 75, 89–91 (1947). 
6
  O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
7
  See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—And Their 
Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 698 (2006) (supporting a qualitative approach to 
assessing the substantiality of risk for standing); Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing and the Precautionary 
Principle, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 494, 511–15 (2008) (advocating for the incorporation of the 
precautionary principle into standing doctrine, under which states would have standing to sue for 
uncertain risks of potentially catastrophic and irreversible injury); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing Injuries, 
1993 SUP. CT. REV. 37, 46–50 (criticizing the Court’s approach to standing in cases alleging a risk of 
future harm); see also Amanda Leiter, Substance or Illusion? The Dangers of Imposing a Standing 
Threshold, 97 GEO. L.J. 391 (2009) (criticizing the D.C. Circuit’s particularly high threshold on risk for 
standing as immoral and not compelled by doctrine). 
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more attention than any other question of justiciability.8 Despite these 
decisions, there continues to be uncertainty about when a threatened injury 
is justiciable. Courts disagree about the necessary threshold of risk for 
justiciability.9 They also often lack the information necessary to determine 
the probability of injury, forcing them to render decisions based on 
guesses—guesses that are assuredly influenced by personal biases and other 
concerns such as separation of powers and federalism. Scholars have 
responded by offering proposals ranging from limiting the probability 
threshold only to cases involving private plaintiffs10 to adopting a more 
flexible approach that considers not only the probability of harm but also 
the severity of the harm.11 
This Article offers a different solution. It argues that the difficulties 
associated with the threshold of risk necessary for standing need not 
encumber the doctrine of standing because Article III does not impose a 
minimum-risk requirement. For hundreds of years, courts have had the 
power to award prospective relief, such as an injunction, to prevent future 
injuries. Yet all future injuries addressed by prospective orders have some 
chance of not occurring. Claims to prevent these injuries are nevertheless 
justiciable because awarding judicial relief will have the real-world effect of 
reducing the risk of injury. A plaintiff who faces a small threat of injury 
likewise has a real interest in reducing that risk of injury. The plaintiff’s 
interest is no less real than the interest held by an individual in avoiding a 
threatened injury that is extremely likely to occur. The only difference is 
that the plaintiff’s stake is smaller. The plaintiff’s claim therefore presents a 
case under Article III. 
Of course, even though a risk of small harm presents a justiciable case, 
there may still be reasons for a court not to intervene in a particular case 
involving a small risk. For example, a plaintiff may face a small risk of 
injury because there is a significant chance that the political branches will 
intervene to prevent the harm from occurring. In that situation, respect for 
the other branches might counsel courts to abstain from exercising that 
 
8
  See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492–97 (2009); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 
724, 734–35 (2008); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521–23 (2007); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181–84 (2000); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 563–64 (1992); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 157 (1990); Diamond v. Charles, 476 
U.S. 54, 66 (1986); Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105; Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 
298–99 (1979); Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 172 & n.2 (1977); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights 
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40–44 (1976); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371–73 (1976); O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 
494. 
9
  Compare, e.g., Vill. of Elk Grove Vill. v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[E]ven a 
small probability of injury is sufficient to create a case or controversy . . . .”), with Sierra Club v. EPA, 
292 F.3d 895, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (requiring a “substantial probability” of injury (quoting Am. 
Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 216 F.3d 50, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
10
  See Nash, supra note 7, at 498–99. 
11
  See Fallon, supra note 7, at 698. 
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jurisdiction. But that decision not to exercise jurisdiction should not rest on 
the lack of a case under Article III; instead, it should depend on prudential 
principles of abstention. 
The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I begins by providing an 
overview of standing and the case-or-controversy clause of Article III. It 
then describes the current doctrines restricting standing for plaintiffs 
seeking prospective relief. Part II explains why threats of injury, no matter 
how small or remote, present a case or controversy. It also points out the 
problems, doctrinal and otherwise, that arise from limiting standing based 
on future injury to only those plaintiffs alleging a substantial risk of harm. 
Part III responds to historical objections and other concerns, such as the 
threat of overwhelming the federal dockets, arising from reading Article III 
to encompass any threat of harm. 
The logical upshot of Parts II and III is that standing should extend to 
all claims involving a risk of future injury. But recognizing that there may 
nevertheless be reasons for courts to refuse to hear some claims involving 
small risks of injury, Part IV offers a framework for cabining the federal 
judiciary’s ability to hear claims involving future injury. It explains that, 
although Article III extends the judicial power over claims alleging a small 
risk of injury, federal courts should develop a prudential doctrine under 
which they may refuse to exercise jurisdiction over such claims. In 
exercising this permissive authority, courts should consider multiple 
factors, such as the need for judicial review, the quality of decisionmaking, 
separation of powers, and federalism. This prudential test would be superior 
to current doctrine not only because it does not rely on a flawed Article III 
doctrine that implicitly obscures so many different theoretical and practical 
considerations, but also because it would increase the legitimacy of judicial 
decisions by promoting transparency. It would also clarify the law and 
result in decisions that more accurately implement the considerations 
leading courts to deny jurisdiction in cases alleging a low risk of injury. 
I. THE CURRENT DOCTRINE OF STANDING 
A. Article III Standing 
Article III of the Constitution extends the federal judicial power to 
resolving “Cases” or “Controversies.”12 The Supreme Court has explained 
that this clause does not empower federal courts to resolve all disputes. 
Instead, the dispute must be “of a Judiciary [N]ature”13—that is, it must be 
capable of resolution by a judicial order imposing a specific form of relief 
through an “an immediate and definitive determination of the legal rights of 
 
12
  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
13
  DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006) (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)). 
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the parties.”14 According to the Supreme Court, this restriction on the power 
of the federal judiciary is fundamental to maintaining the appropriate 
separation of powers.15 By permitting the courts to pass on legal questions 
only in the context of resolving disputes, this doctrine ensures that courts do 
not usurp the role of the political branches to set policy and define legal 
obligations and rights.16 
The principal doctrine employed by the courts to enforce the limits of 
Article III is standing. For plaintiffs to have standing to bring suit in federal 
court, they must demonstrate that they have suffered, or are about to suffer, 
an “injury in fact,” which has been broadly defined to include injuries not 
only to economic and physical interests but also to spiritual and aesthetic 
interests.17 A plaintiff must also show that this factual injury is “fairly 
traceable” to the actions of the defendant, and that it “will likely be 
redressed by a favorable decision.”18 In the Court’s view, these 
requirements are necessary conditions for the existence of an actual 
 
14
  Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937); accord David P. Currie, 
Misunderstanding Standing, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 41–47; see also MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, 
Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (noting that to be justiciable, the dispute must “admi[t] of specific relief 
through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law 
would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.” (alteration in original) (quoting Haworth, 300 U.S. at 241) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (“[T]he standing 
question . . . is whether the constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be 
understood as granting persons in the plaintiff’s position a right to judicial relief.”). 
15
  See Cuno, 547 U.S. at 341 (“[N]o principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in 
our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases 
or controversies.” (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
16
  See id. at 340–41; see also Marshall, supra note 3, at 95 (“If the judicial power extended to every 
question under the constitution it would involve almost every subject proper for legislative discussion 
and decision; if to every question under the laws and treaties of the United States it would involve 
almost every subject on which the executive could act. The division of power [among the branches of 
government], could exist no longer, and the other departments would be swallowed up by the 
judiciary.”). 
17
  Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152, 154 (1970). Courts and 
commentators have disagreed over the kinds of injuries that should suffice for standing. Some have 
argued that a violation of rights should suffice for standing, see, e.g., Zivotofsky ex rel. Ari Z. v. Sec’y 
of State, 444 F.3d 614, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“[A] concrete and particular injury for standing purposes 
can . . . consist of the violation of an individual right conferred on a person by statute.”); F. Andrew 
Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 324 (2008), while 
others have contended that standing should turn on whether the plaintiff suffered any consequences from 
the violation of the right, see, e.g., Doe v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 199 F.3d 146, 153 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(“The proper analysis of standing focuses on whether the plaintiff suffered an actual injury, not on 
whether a statute was violated.”); John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE 
L.J. 1219, 1220 (1993). It is unnecessary to resolve that dispute in this paper, which addresses the 
requirement that the injury for standing—whatever it may be—be nonspeculative and imminent. 
18
  Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997); accord Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 
493 (2009); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 
(2000); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
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controversy by limiting jurisdiction to disputes in which the plaintiff has a 
direct stake in the litigation.19 Individuals may resort to the federal courts 
only to remedy their personal injuries; they cannot go to the courts simply 
to pursue a policy agenda.20 
B. Standing in Cases Alleging Future Injuries 
Standing in federal courts is not limited to claims for retrospective 
relief like damages. Article III empowers the federal judiciary to hear cases 
in “[e]quity,”21 which encompasses requests for prospective injunctions.22 
There is an unbroken historical practice of federal courts exercising 
jurisdiction over claims for prospective relief to prevent threatened injuries 
that have not yet occurred.23 
But the Court has not extended Article III jurisdiction over all claims 
of threatened future injuries. Out of concern that recognizing the 
justiciability of all such injuries would unduly expand the power of the 
federal courts to resolve legal issues, it has limited the type of future 
injuries that suffice for standing.24 The Court has held that for a plaintiff to 
have standing, the threat of injury must be “real.”25 This Article calls this 
the “minimum-risk requirement.” Relying on this requirement, the Court 
has not hesitated to exercise its power to grant injunctions to prevent 
threatened injuries that are likely to occur.26 But when the threat of injury is 
 
19
  See Summers, 555 U.S. at 493 (noting that standing ensures that the plaintiff has “‘alleged such a 
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant his invocation of federal-court 
jurisdiction” (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 498–99 (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
20
  See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576. 
21
  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity . . . .”). 
22
  See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual 
Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 154–58 (1998) (documenting the early American history of 
copyright injunctions); Daniel J. Walker, Note, Administrative Injunctions: Assessing the Propriety of 
*on-Class Collective Relief, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1119, 1129–32 (2005) (documenting the early history 
of injunctions in America). 
23
  See, e.g., Vicksburg Waterworks Co. v. Vicksburg, 185 U.S. 65, 82 (1902) (holding that a 
“threatened” injury from illegal activity presented an actual case); see also Valley Forge Christian Coll. 
v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (recognizing standing 
for a party who “personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury” (quoting Gladstone, Realtors 
v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979))). 
24
  See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. 
25
  E.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 
95, 101 (1983); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109–10 (1969); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 
330 U.S. 75, 89–91 (1947); see also Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941) 
(requiring a “substantial controversy”). 
26
  See Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352, 366–68 (1980) (finding standing for workers to challenge 
refusal to apply law where application of law would have increased the likelihood that land would be 
available for sale at a low price). 
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too low, the Court has said, the dispute is merely “hypothetical” and is 
consequently insufficient to support standing.27 
Whitmore v. Arkansas28 provides an example of this minimum-risk 
requirement. Whitmore, an Arkansas inmate who had been sentenced to 
death, sought to intervene in an Arkansas state action to challenge the 
imposition of the death penalty on another inmate, Ronald Simmons.29 
According to Whitmore, although Simmons opted not to appeal his death 
sentence, the Eighth Amendment required the state to conduct appellate 
review before imposing the death penalty.30 Whitmore explained that he had 
an interest in intervening because, if Simmons’s death sentence were 
overturned, that decision might provide a state law basis for Whitmore to 
challenge his own death sentence before the Arkansas Supreme Court31—
not on direct appeal, because Whitmore’s appeals had been exhausted, but 
instead in a subsequent case if Whitmore were granted habeas relief and 
then retried, convicted, and resentenced to death.32 The Supreme Court 
dismissed the case for lack of standing.33 It explained that the injury that 
Whitmore claimed—an increased possibility that he would be executed if 
Arkansas did not review Simmons’s sentence—was “too speculative to 
invoke the jurisdiction of an Art. III court.”34 The Court reasoned that, even 
if the state had reviewed Simmons’s case, Whitmore would still face the 
hurdles of obtaining habeas relief, being subsequently resentenced to death, 
and then convincing the Arkansas Supreme Court that Simmons’s case 
should affect the outcome in Whitmore’s case.35 
 
27
  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; see Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 66 (1986) (rejecting standing based 
on “unadorned speculation”); Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105 (denying standing to an individual seeking to 
challenge police chokehold because it was only speculative that the plaintiff would be subjected to 
chokehold); Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 171–72 & n.2 (1977) (denying standing in a claim 
challenging police use of deadly force against a person attempting to escape arrest); O’Shea v. Littleton, 
414 U.S. 488, 497 (1974) (denying standing to residents who sought injunctive relief against judges 
allegedly engaged in a pattern and practice of discriminatory practices on the ground that the threat to 
plaintiffs from this discrimination was only “speculation and conjecture”); Golden, 394 U.S. at 109 
(denying standing for a claim based on the potential future candidacy of a former Congressman); 
Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 89–91 (stating that a “hypothetical threat [of enforcement] is not enough” for 
jurisdiction); see also Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1294 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (denying standing for claim of speculative future injury), modified on reh’g by 513 
F.3d 234 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 
28
  495 U.S. 149. 
29
  Id. at 153. 
30
  Id. at 153–54. 
31
  Under Arkansas law, the Arkansas Supreme Court assessed the propriety of death sentences by 
comparing them to other death sentences. See id. at 156–57. 
32
  Id. at 156. 
33
  Id. at 166. 
34
  Id. at 157. 
35
  Id. 
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This requirement of a sufficiently likely threat of injury frequently 
arises in challenges to administrative actions. Individuals often challenge 
government regulation that they perceive as too lax, basing standing on the 
claim that a more stringent regulation would further decrease the risk that 
they would suffer harm from the regulated activity. Frequently, however, 
the marginal increase in risk from the less stringent regulation is small. For 
example, in Sierra Club v. EPA, environmental groups challenged a 
regulation on the storage and disposal of hazardous sludge.36 To establish 
standing, the group argued that some of its members lived and worked near 
facilities that, under the regulation, could be used for the production and 
storage of the sludge, and that the proximity to those facilities could result 
in injury.37 The D.C. Circuit denied standing, explaining that the challengers 
had not established a sufficient likelihood of injury from the permitted 
production and disposal.38 
In addition to requiring that a threat be “real,” courts have held that 
standing is appropriate only when the threatened risk is “imminent.”39 This 
imminence requirement also appears in the doctrine of ripeness. Unlike 
standing, which limits who can bring suit, ripeness defines when a person 
may bring suit.40 The ripeness requirement prohibits federal courts from 
 
36
  292 F.3d 895, 896–97 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
37
  Id. at 901. 
38
  Id. at 902; see also NRDC v. EPA, 440 F.3d 476, 481–84 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that a risk of 
1 in 4.2 billion is insufficiently substantial to support standing), overruled on other grounds by 464 F.3d 
1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Ctr. for Law & Educ. v. Dep’t of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(denying standing to a plaintiff who failed to establish a “demonstrably increased risk” from a 
challenged regulation (quoting Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 667) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). Professor Leiter has argued that this risk threshold for standing is unique to the D.C. 
Circuit. See Leiter, supra note 7, at 404. But the Supreme Court has held that not all risks suffice for 
standing, instead requiring that the risk be “real.” See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–
02 (1983) (internal quotation mark omitted). And several circuits other than the D.C. Circuit have 
likewise imposed a heightened risk threshold. See Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843, 855 (6th Cir. 
2006) (stating that an increased risk of harm suffices for standing, so long as the risk is “neither 
speculative nor remote”), superseded by 473 F.3d 692, 694 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc); Paul Revere 
Variable Annuity Ins. Co. v. Kirschhofer, 226 F.3d 15, 24 (1st Cir. 2000) (requiring a “realistic risk of 
significant harm” for standing); see also Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 950 
(9th Cir. 2002) (requiring a “credible threat of harm” to support standing); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 159 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that low risks 
because of a lack of imminence do not suffice for standing). That said, some circuits have rejected a 
minimum threshold of risk for standing despite the Supreme Court’s holding. See Baur v. Veneman, 352 
F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding standing based on the “enhanced risk” from exposure to 
“potentially harmful products”); Vill. of Elk Grove Vill. v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(“[E]ven a small probability of injury is sufficient to create a case or controversy . . . .”). 
39
  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (quoting Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155); 
see also O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) (requiring the risk to be “immediate” (quoting 
Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109 (1969)) (internal quotation mark omitted)); Massachusetts v. 
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) (requiring the plaintiff to show “that he has sustained or is 
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury”). 
40
  See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 160–62 (1987). 
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hearing cases prematurely.41 Like standing, ripeness implements Article 
III’s limitations on the judicial power.42 The chief requirement of ripeness is 
that plaintiffs may invoke federal jurisdiction only if they are so in danger 
of suffering an injury as to require immediate judicial relief.43 The Court has 
explained that this hardship inquiry is identical to the imminence 
requirement of standing: parties that do not face an imminent threat 
sufficient to support standing likewise do not face a hardship rendering their 
claim ripe.44 Given that the constitutionally mandated imminence 
requirement is the same for ripeness and standing, this Article will, for 
convenience, discuss the imminence requirement solely in terms of 
standing.45 
Although there are several reasons for the imminence requirement,46 in 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court stated that imminence is 
relevant to justiciability only insofar as it relates to the probability that an 
injury will occur.47 Of course, lack of risk does not eliminate risk itself; 
rather, it provides more opportunity for other factors to influence the risk. 
Thus, as the Court has explained, the more remote an injury is in time, the 
less likely it is to occur.48 For example, suppose Paul seeks an injunction 
against Duncan based on Duncan’s threats to attack Paul in twenty years. 
There is a good chance that at some point during those twenty years some 
 
41
  See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967), abrogated by Califano v. Sanders, 430 
U.S. 99, 105 (1977). 
42
  See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767 n.2 (2010) (“Ripeness 
reflects constitutional considerations that implicate ‘Article III limitations on judicial power[]’ . . . .” 
(quoting Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993))). 
43
  See Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149 (stating that ripeness turns, in part, on the “hardship to the 
parties of withholding court consideration”). 
44
  See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128 n.8 (2007); Hotel & Rest. Emps. 
Union, Local 25 v. Attorney Gen., 804 F.2d 1256, 1277 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Silberman, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (equating constitutional ripeness with imminence), vacated, Hotel & Rest. 
Emps. Union, Local 25 v. Smith, 846 F.2d 1499 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc); see also Nichol, supra note 
40, at 172 (noting the link between ripeness and standing). 
45
  Ripeness also has prudential aspects. See Stolt-*ielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1767 n.2 (noting the 
“prudential reasons” underlying ripeness (quoting Reno, 509 U.S. at 57 n.18) (internal quotation mark 
omitted)). The prudential component of ripeness asks whether the case is fit for judicial review at the 
time of suit. Whether a case is fit for review does not implicate the power of the courts to act; instead, it 
focuses on whether the court has adequate information to make an informed decision. See ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.4.1, at 119 (5th ed. 2007) (“[T]he focus on the quality of the 
record seems prudential.”). On this understanding, courts have discretion to consider a claim that may 
not be fit for review, but they are constitutionally forbidden from considering claims when delaying 
review would not present a hardship to the plaintiff. 
46
  One reason to require imminence is to promote efficient use of resources. For more on this and 
other reasons, see infra Part IV.C. 
47
  504 U.S. 555, 565 n.2 (1992) (stating that the “purpose” of “imminence” is “to ensure that the 
alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is ‘certainly impending’” 
(quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
48
  See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2. 
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intervening event will occur (such as Paul’s or Duncan’s death, or their 
falling out of touch) that will prevent the attack from occurring.49 Because 
the probability of the attack actually occurring is so low, Lujan suggests 
that Paul lacks standing. 
Because under the Court’s theory the imminence requirement is simply 
one component of the requirement that a threatened injury not be too 
speculative, the mere fact that an injury is not imminent should not 
necessarily render that injury nonjusticiable. If an injury is inevitable, it is 
justiciable even if it may not occur until the distant future.50 Thus, if Paul 
could somehow demonstrate with certainty that Duncan would attack him 
in twenty years, Paul would have standing to pursue his claim. 
II. EXTENDING STANDING TO ALL THREATENED INJURIES 
The minimum-risk requirement is an unwarranted limit on federal 
power under Article III. A dispute constitutes a justiciable case if a plaintiff 
has a personal interest at stake.51 A threat of injury, even if the threat is 
small, establishes a personal interest. By insisting that Article III does not 
empower courts to hear claims based on low risks of injury, current 
standing doctrine prevents individuals who may indeed be injured in the 
future (although at the time of suit the chance of injury is small) from 
obtaining relief that would prevent that injury. It also limits the legislature’s 
ability to provide redress for potential risks by barring federal courts from 
enforcing laws to prevent those risks when the risks are small. Moreover, 
the limits on probabilistic standing have resulted in unpredictability in 
standing law both because courts have not precisely defined what 
constitutes an adequate risk and because courts have often lacked the 
information necessary to determine whether the risk of injury in a particular 
case meets that threshold. 
A. All Probabilistic Injuries Present an Actual Case or Controversy 
Article III does not distinguish between low risks of harm and high 
risks of harm. It states simply that federal courts may hear “Cases” or 
“Controversies.”52 Article III does not define those terms. The 
 
49
  See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 495–97 (2009). 
50
  The Court has made this observation in the ripeness context. See Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act 
Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 143 (1974) (finding a claim ripe even though the injury was not imminent because 
the “injurious event [was] certain to occur”). 
51
  Courts have defined the interests to support standing broadly to include not only economic and 
physical interests, but also aesthetic, spiritual, and recreational interests. See Ass’n of Data Processing 
Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970). Still, not all personal interests will suffice. Courts have 
refused standing based on racial stigmatization, see Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759 (1984), and the 
interest in governmental compliance with the law, see United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 
(1974). 
52
  See supra Part I.A. 
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Constitutional Convention also provides little insight on the meaning of the 
terms; the only statement about them is that they limit the judicial power “to 
cases of a Judiciary Nature.”53 
Although there has been disagreement on the precise contours of what 
constitutes a case, there is general agreement that a dispute constitutes a 
case when two parties have adverse legal interests and that a court can 
resolve the dispute through “decid[ing] on the rights” of the parties.54 Thus, 
not all disputes form a case. Abstract disagreements about the law, for 
example, do not form a justiciable case because they do not involve adverse 
interests.55 The judicial power is properly invoked when a plaintiff has at 
stake a personal interest that is adverse to the defendant’s interest and a 
court can vindicate that interest immediately through a judicial order based 
on a legal determination of the rights of the parties.56 
A plaintiff facing a threat of injury from a defendant’s illegal conduct 
meets this threshold. That plaintiff has an interest in preventing that injury 
from occurring, or at least an interest in reducing the risk of its occurrence. 
Thus, for example, if a factory’s emissions create a 10% chance that Paul, 
who lives next door to the factory, will develop lung cancer, Paul has a real 
interest in stopping the factory’s emissions even if there is a 90% chance 
that the emissions will not cause him to develop cancer. If the law forbids 
such emissions, a court may vindicate Paul’s interest by ordering the 
factory to cease from producing those emissions. That is the reason why 
courts have held that they have jurisdiction to hear claims for prospective 
relief.57 
The same reasoning applies when the risk of injury is extremely low. 
In such cases, the plaintiff still has a personal interest that the courts may 
vindicate through an appropriate order. If Paul faces only a 0.0001% 
chance, or even a 0.00001% chance, of developing cancer because of the 
factory’s emissions, he still has a real interest in stopping the factory’s 
emissions even though there is little chance that the emissions will harm 
him. To be sure, when the risk of injury is small, the plaintiff’s stake in the 
 
53
  THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 13, at 430; Richard J. Pierce, 
Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1763–64 (1999) (stating that the statement was 
“[t]he only remotely relevant” one regarding the case-or-controversy requirement). 
54
  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 
(1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803)); accord Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 598 
(2007) (plurality opinion); id. at 636 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
55
  See Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 297 (1979). 
56
  See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (noting that to be justiciable, 
the dispute must “admi[t] of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished 
from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
57
  See NRDC v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (finding risk of 1 in 200,000 sufficiently 
substantial to support standing). 
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case is correspondingly smaller. But the plaintiff still has a real-world 
interest that the court may vindicate. 
One might argue that a tiny risk of injury does not actually present a 
dispute because there is an extremely low likelihood that the injury will 
occur. But the fact that the injury might not occur does not render the claim 
nonjusticiable; otherwise, federal courts would lack jurisdiction to hear any 
claims for prospective relief because all potential future injuries have some 
chance of not transpiring. Rather, it is the possibility that the injury might 
occur that creates the plaintiff’s interest in the case and that ought to render 
the case justiciable. Even when the risk of harm is very low, there is still 
some chance that the threatened injury will occur. The plaintiff accordingly 
has an interest at stake: he may be harmed. 
What this means is that all claims based on a risk of injury present an 
actual case or controversy, no matter how small the risk. So long as (1) the 
challenged activity increases the plaintiff’s risk of suffering harm and (2) a 
judicial order could stop the challenged activity, thereby removing the 
increased risk of harm, courts should have Article III jurisdiction to hear the 
claim.58 Whether there is an actual dispute between two parties is a binary 
question: there either is a dispute, or there is not. If a substantial risk of 
injury constitutes an actual dispute, a small risk of injury does as well. The 
degree of risk goes to the intensity of the dispute, not whether it exists at 
all.59 
The Supreme Court has recognized a similar argument in concluding 
that there is no threshold requirement for the size of an injury. It has 
explained that any “identifiable trifle” relating to a cognizable interest will 
support standing.60 Thus, standing treats identically a plaintiff who alleges 
 
58
  Recall that, aside from injury, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the injury is traceable to the 
defendant and that a judicial order would redress the injury. See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 
130 S. Ct. 2743, 2752 (2010) (setting forth requirements of “traceab[ility]” and “redressab[ility]” as 
prerequisites to standing); supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
59
  One might argue that if the defendant’s action produces only a small threat of injury and the 
plaintiff would still face some threat of incurring that same injury even if the defendant’s conduct were 
stopped, then the injury the plaintiff may face is not traceable to the defendant and would not be 
redressed by a court order in the plaintiff’s favor. But in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court explained that 
even when a plaintiff faces a risk of injury from multiple sources, if the action represents even a “small 
incremental step” towards eliminating that risk, then it satisfies the traceability and redressability 
requirements of Article III. 549 U.S. 497, 524 (2007). 
60
  United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 
689 n.14 (1973) (quoting Kenneth Culp Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 601, 
613 (1968)). There are reasons to question this doctrine. If any identifiable trifle can support standing, 
standing should pose no barrier to any plaintiff’s suit because anyone who is motivated enough to file 
suit has suffered some emotional distress—which is at least a trifling injury—from the challenged 
conduct. Indeed, for this reason, the Court itself has limited the types of injuries that may support 
standing. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 
454 U.S. 464, 486 (1982) (refusing to recognize standing based solely on psychic harm). This limitation 
has led to confusion in standing law because the Court has refused to abandon its rhetorical stance that 
any trifle suffices for standing and has continued to allow standing based on certain types of psychic 
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only 1¢ in harm and a plaintiff who alleges a $100,000 injury; both have a 
personal stake warranting invocation of the courts.61 A plaintiff’s interest in 
a case depends on both the size and likelihood of suffering an injury.62 
Therefore, because standing does not impose a minimum requirement for 
the size of the injury, it also should not impose a threshold for the 
likelihood of injury. 
Indeed, more than being merely conceptually inconsistent with the 
“identifiable trifle” standard, the minimum-risk requirement directly 
conflicts with holdings that the size of the harm is irrelevant to whether a 
plaintiff has standing. That is because risk of harm itself—as opposed to the 
particular harm that is threatened—may constitute an injury in fact. To use 
the same example as before, the injury supporting Paul’s standing is not the 
cancer that he may develop, but the risk that he might develop cancer. 
Although many cases focus only on the harms that will result when 
determining whether a plaintiff has standing to challenge future injuries, a 
number of decisions establish that a risk of harm itself constitutes an injury 
in fact.63 One example comes from the equal protection context. Courts 
have held that the relevant injury a person suffers from unlawful 
discrimination is the loss of opportunity that results from discrimination, 
regardless of the other consequences of that discrimination. Thus, where a 
state discriminates against a job applicant on the basis of race, the denial of 
opportunity to compete on equal footing for the job is the relevant injury, 
not the denial of the job.64 Indeed, even if the minority applicant is hired, he 
 
injury such as the displeasure arising from harm to aesthetic interests. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000). That said, there are also reasons for 
retaining the identifiable trifle standard. Among other things, the standard prevents judges from 
imposing their preferences in deciding which cases are “worth” adjudicating. Different people value 
different things differently. A dollar might matter more to X than to Y, because Y might be much richer 
than X. Setting a minimum threshold on the value of the injury for standing risks excluding harms that 
some might think are important. See generally Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure 
of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 324–28 (2002) (noting that judges recognize injury based on 
their own preferences). 
61
  See Leiter, supra note 7, at 406. 
62
  This concept is reflected in the notion of expected value. See 5 DAVID BESANKO, DAVID 
DRANOVE, MARK SHANLEY & SCOTT SCHAEFER, ECONOMICS OF STRATEGY 470 & 503 n.2 (5th ed. 
2010).  
63
  See Sunstein, supra note 7, at 46–50. One example of risk causing injury outside the legal context 
comes from the stock market. The market routinely discounts the present values of a firm’s securities 
based on the risks associated with that firm’s future performance. Conduct today that increases the risk 
for the firm tomorrow injures the firm by reducing the firm’s present value. See Daniel A. Farber, 
Uncertainty as a Basis for Standing, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1123, 1123 (2005). 
64
  See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 211 (1995) (stating that injury occurs 
when a “discriminatory classification prevent[s] the plaintiff from competing on an equal footing” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of 
Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 667 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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may still have suffered the harm of discrimination.65 Loss of opportunity to 
compete on a level playing field is essentially a risk injury: the 
discrimination increases the probability that the discriminated-against 
individual will not get the job.66 
Together with the principle that the size of the harm is irrelevant to 
whether a plaintiff has standing, the fact that a risk of harm may constitute 
an injury itself means that any risk of harm, even a tiny one, should suffice 
for Article III standing. Indeed, the Supreme Court has implicitly 
recognized this point in cases alleging procedural injury.67 
Procedural injuries occur when agencies undertake actions without 
affording the statutory procedures due to the plaintiff—for example, when 
an agency promulgates a rule without addressing substantive comments 
submitted by the plaintiff on that rule.68 In those cases, courts have insisted 
that the injury supporting standing is not the failure of the agency to 
observe the procedures; rather, the injury stems from the interest that is 
affected by the agency’s failure to observe the procedures.69 But it is clear 
that the injury is not the effect of the agency action on the plaintiff. Courts 
have explained that standing is appropriate only if the court can redress the 
injury in fact to the plaintiff,70 and prevailing on a procedural claim does not 
necessarily prevent the agency from undertaking the same action.71 Even if 
a plaintiff prevails on a claim that an agency failed to address the plaintiff’s 
comments, the agency may still promulgate the same regulation on remand, 
just with a better justification. But the successful claim does reduce the 
probability that the agency will promulgate the same rule; the comments 
may lead the agency to promulgate a different rule.72 Thus, the relevant 




  Likewise, even if the nonminority applicant would have received the job under a race-neutral 
process, the minority applicant is still harmed if the actual reason for the decision was race-based. 
66
  One might argue that the recognition of standing for loss-of-opportunity claims might be based 
on a normative conclusion that such injuries are particularly important and therefore do not establish that 
standing extends to other risk injuries. But the Court has not made that distinction. Moreover, the 
normative desirability of recognizing standing for a particular claim is encompassed by the separate 
judicially cognizable test. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). 
67
  Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 495–97 (2009); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573. 
68
  See Summers, 555 U.S. at 496–97. 
69
  See id. 
70
  See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000). 
71
  See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 
91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 228 (1992). 
72
  See STEPHEN G. BREYER, RICHARD B. STEWART, CASS R. SUNSTEIN & ADRIAN VERMEULE, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 351 (6th ed. 2006) 
(describing the range of consequences from judicial remands of agency actions).  
73
  To be sure, some injuries—such as stigma and dissatisfaction with government action—cannot 
support standing. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 45, § 2.3.2, at 74. But those exceptions depend on the 
type of injury, not the size of that injury. Economic injury will always support standing even if the 
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Although courts have deemed them justiciable, procedural injuries 
present a conundrum under the minimum-risk requirement. The reason is 
that many claims asserting procedural injury do not allege imminent harm 
because plaintiffs often must challenge administrative actions long before 
any harm occurs. Instead of declaring these claims nonjusticiable, however, 
the Supreme Court has stated that the imminence requirement does not 
apply to claims based solely on procedural injury.74 Thus, in Lujan, the 
Court explained that a person “living adjacent to the site for proposed 
construction of a federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the 
licensing agency’s failure to prepare an environmental impact statement, 
even though . . . the dam will not be completed for many years.”75 
But as noted earlier, under the Court’s view, the imminence 
requirement is simply one component of the minimum-risk requirement.76 
Imminence ensures that the harm is not overly speculative.77 There is no 
reason to treat a low probability of injury resulting from a lack of 
imminence differently from a low probability resulting from other causes.78 
The reason that an injury is unlikely to occur is irrelevant to whether a 
dispute constitutes a case; all that matters is whether the parties have 
interests that are adverse and the court can issue a ruling that resolves that 
conflict.79 Accordingly, if Article III does not forbid actions based on 
procedural claims where the injury is unlikely to occur because it is not 
imminent, neither should it prohibit claims based on injuries that are 
unlikely to occur for other reasons. 
B. Other Advantages of the “Any-Risk-of-Harm” Standard 
Recognizing that any threat of injury constitutes a justiciable case or 
controversy would result in a number of other improvements over the 
minimum-risk requirement. To start, broad probabilistic standing would 
allow the courts to carry out better their role of preventing avoidable harms. 
One reason that courts have the power to award injunctions and other forms 
of prospective relief is that people should not be forced to sustain injuries 
 
economic loss is extremely small. Likewise, if an injury is of the sort that cannot support standing, 
standing will still be unavailable even if that injury is extremely large. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian 
Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485–86 (1982) (refusing to 
find standing based on intense dissatisfaction with government policies because dissatisfaction with 
government policies cannot alone support standing). 
74
  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992). 
75
  Id. 
76
  See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
77
  See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
78
  If anything, a lack of imminence provides greater reasons for not recognizing standing because 
other branches might have sufficient time to cure the alleged harm. See infra Part IV.C. 
79
  See supra text accompanying note 56. 
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that can be prevented.80 The minimum-risk requirement impairs that power. 
Although a low-threat injury only rarely occurs, it still may transpire. For 
example, even if the risk of injury is one in a million, there is a greater than 
50% chance that at least one resident in a town of one million residents 
subject to that risk will sustain that injury.81 Under the minimum-risk 
requirement, those individuals who will eventually end up suffering that 
unlikely injury are prevented from obtaining judicial intervention to prevent 
that injury. 
Extending the judicial power to any threat of injury would also better 
achieve legislative goals. Congress ordinarily does not legislate to prevent 
injuries to particular individuals. Instead, legislation usually is targeted at 
reducing the number of injuries to the population at large.82 It is, in other 
words, probabilistic in nature.83 Imposing a threshold risk requirement for 
standing undermines Congress’s ability to legislate in this way. Congress 
may seek to prevent all risks of a particular type of harm, but courts will not 
enforce that legislation with respect to an individual who faces only a small 
risk of suffering that harm. Indeed, in some cases no individual may face 
the risk necessary to support standing, and consequently Congress’s 
policies could go unenforced. In short, under the minimum-risk 
requirement, Congress and the courts talk past each other.84 
Extending standing to any risk of harm would also result in a more 
rational doctrine. A rational plaintiff’s interest in a case depends not on the 
size of the harm he faces but on the expected value of the harm—that is, the 
probability of the harm multiplied by the size of the harm. For example, a 
plaintiff should treat a 10% chance of a $500 injury the same as a 50% 
chance of a $100 injury, because both have an expected value of $50. But 
 
80
  See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—RESTITUTION § 2.5(3), at 
92–93 (2d ed. 1993) (articulating arguments underlying coercive remedies).  
81
  Indeed, there is a greater than 50% chance of injury occurring to a resident in a town of 693,147 
residents. This results from solving for x in the following inequality: 1 - (999,999/1,000,000)x > 0.5.  
82
  See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445–46 (1915) 
(distinguishing between legislation, which is general, and adjudication, which is particularized); Leiter, 
supra note 7, at 413–14. 
83
  See Felix Frankfurter, A *ote on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002, 1005 (1924) 
(“[L]egislation to a considerable extent must necessarily be based on probabilities . . . .”). 
84
  Courts could solve this problem by considering standing based on the aggregate risk to a 
population. Under that approach, standing would be easier to establish because, even though one person 
might not face a sufficient threat of injury, the community as a whole would face a substantial threat of 
injury. But in Summers v. Earth Island Institute, the Court rejected this approach. 555 U.S. 488, 497–99 
(2009). There, an environmental association brought suit to challenge regulations that would affect 
various parcels of land regulated by the U.S. Forest Service. Id. at 491. Although no member had firm 
plans to visit a site covered by this regulation, the organization had more than 700,000 members who 
enjoy the forest in which the sites were located, making it statistically likely that at least one of the 
members of the organization would visit one of those sites. Id. at 497–98. The Court held that the 
association lacked standing, explaining that standing cannot be aggregated among the members of an 
organization; instead, each member must be evaluated independently for standing. Id. at 498–99. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 72 
because of the minimum-risk requirement, standing doctrine does not treat 
these two equivalent expected values the same way.85 
As noted earlier, although it imposes a minimum requirement for risk 
of injury, standing does not impose a minimum threshold for the size of an 
injury; any identifiable trifle will suffice.86 Consequently, a plaintiff may 
have standing to challenge a small injury that is likely to occur, but lack 
standing to challenge a large injury that is unlikely to occur, even though 
the expected harm from those two injuries is the same. Indeed, under 
current doctrine, standing exists for a potential trivial injury that barely 
clears the probability threshold, but does not exist for a severe injury that is 
just below that probability threshold. This is true even if the expected harm 
of the more serious injury exceeds that of the expected harm of the more 
likely but trivial injury. This discrepancy is reflected in decisions finding 
standing for an individual likely to suffer the tiny harm of the denial of a 
fraction of a vote,87 but denying standing for an individual who faced a 
smaller risk of the greater harm of being subject to a chokehold that had the 
potential to inflict serious physical injury.88 Although the two injuries are 
not easily compared, it is hardly unreasonable to think that the expected 
harm of the less likely chokehold exceeded that of the less potentially 
harmful but more likely denial of a fraction of a vote. 
A similar irrationality occurs in cases where a large number of people 
face a risk of harm. Imagine two situations, each involving a population of 
1000 people. In the first scenario, one member of that population has a 
100% chance of being harmed. In the second scenario, there is a 100% 
chance that one random person in the population of 1000 will be harmed; 
thus, each person faces a 0.1% chance of harm. In both cases, a person will 
be hurt. But under the minimum-risk requirement, standing is proper only in 
the first case. (One might argue that a 0.1% chance of harm is substantial 
enough to justify standing, but that objection is easily answered by 
increasing the population at risk so as to reduce the risk of harm to any one 
person.) The difference is that in the first situation we know ex ante who 
will be hurt while in the second we know only ex post. But that difference 
should not matter, at least so far as justiciability is concerned. In both cases 
a court may enter an order preventing the harm (in the former case by 
granting an injunction for the particular victim, in the latter for anyone 
among the potential victims). Of course, there is a question about who is the 
appropriate plaintiff. In the case of the known victim, the plaintiff is 
 
85
  See Leiter, supra note 7, at 408–09 (making a similar observation). 
86
  See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
87
  See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 
669, 689 n.14 (1973) (“We have allowed important interests to be vindicated by plaintiffs with no more 
at stake in the outcome of an action than a fraction of a vote, a $5 fine and costs, and a $1.50 poll tax.” 
(citations omitted)).  
88
  See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102–03 (1983). 
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obvious, while in the case of the random victim, any individual who faces 
the threat of harm has a stake in the suit. The consequence is that many 
individuals have standing to bring suit. But the number of potential 
plaintiffs does not affect whether a dispute presents a justiciable 
controversy. Courts routinely hear claims, like those alleging securities 
fraud, involving many plaintiffs.89 
Aside from the irrationality of the doctrine, the minimum-risk 
requirement is troublingly imprecise. As currently framed, the requirement 
involves a qualitative, not a quantitative, assessment. To establish standing, 
plaintiffs need not clear a precise numerical threshold of risk for standing; 
instead, they must show that the risk of injury is “real.”90 But courts have 
disagreed about when a risk of harm is sufficiently high to be real.91 
Moreover, even when there is agreement about the appropriate qualitative 
standard, reasonable people routinely differ about whether that qualitative 
standard is satisfied. What constitutes a “real” threat of injury for one 
person may not for another.92 Ambiguity is the inevitable consequence of a 
qualitative standard. 
Exacerbating this problem is the fact that courts generally have proven 
themselves incapable of applying the minimum-risk requirement in a 
rigorous way. As a general matter, courts have failed to engage in a careful 
analysis in evaluating whether a threatened injury alleged by a plaintiff has 
a sufficient likelihood of occurring. One example of this shortcoming is in 
the courts’ failure to recognize that most claims of future injury actually 
involve multiple probabilities. 
Consider the simple case in which Jim seeks an order barring Todd 
from hitting him with a bat. This claim involves at least two separate 
probabilistic events. There is first the probability of Todd actually 
undertaking the activity that could cause harm—swinging the bat. The 
 
89
  See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998); accord id. at 36 (Scalia, J., dissenting). To be sure, 
courts have refused to recognize standing for individuals claiming a generalized grievance. But so long 
as each plaintiff has an individualized interest at stake—as is the case when each individual faces a 
threat of harm—each plaintiff has standing to bring suit even if the result is that many different plaintiffs 
have standing. See id. at 35. An example may illustrate this point. Suppose several people each face a 
20% chance of developing cancer from exposure to a toxic substance. Although each individual faces an 
identical risk of developing cancer, the risk is personal to each individual. Each person faces an 
individual risk of harm. 
90
  See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
91
  Compare Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (requiring a substantial risk for 
standing), with Vill. of Elk Grove Vill. v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1993) (allowing any risk to 
support standing). 
92
  Compare, e.g., La. Envtl. Action Network v. EPA, 172 F.3d 65, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (concluding 
that the probability of harm from a potential deposit of hazardous waste was sufficiently substantial to 
support standing), with id. at 71–72 (Sentelle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (disagreeing 
with the majority opinion). 
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second is the probability that the swing will hit Jim, causing him harm.93 
When the occurrence of an event depends on multiple probabilities, the 
probability of that event occurring is the product of each of the 
probabilities. Thus, if there is a 40% chance that Todd will swing the bat, 
and a 10% chance that Todd will hit Jim if he swings the bat, there is only a 
4% (40% × 10%) chance that Jim will suffer harm (assuming the 
probabilities are independent). 
Courts addressing probabilistic standing have generally not analyzed 
separate probabilities in assessing whether the plaintiff had standing. In 
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures 
(SCRAP), for example, environmentalists located in Washington D.C. 
challenged a freight rate increase for railroads.94 The plaintiffs claimed that 
the rate increase would lead to less recycling because the greater rates 
would allow railroads to afford transporting raw material, which 
consequently would encourage more mining and lumbering.95 According to 
the environmentalists, these events could cause them aesthetic harm 
because some of these resources might be taken from the Washington area, 
resulting in more refuse in local parks.96 The probability of each of these 
events occurring was rather low. There was uncertainty whether the rate 
increases would indeed result in more consumption of raw materials, 
whether the consumption would result in mining and logging in the 
Washington area, whether those activities would produce refuse in local 
parks, and whether the plaintiffs would visit any of the precise locations 
affected by greater refuse. Although it is difficult to measure the probability 
of each of these events, the probability of each event occurring 
independently was no doubt low, and consequently the product of those 
probabilities was extremely low.97 Nevertheless, the Court found standing.98 
Contrast SCRAP with Lujan.99 There, petitioners sought to challenge a 
government regulation exposing endangered species in foreign countries to 
 
93
  There is also the question whether the harm the plaintiff suffers is cognizable under the law—a 
probabilistic inquiry because courts have introduced uncertainty by refusing to recognize some injuries 
as sufficient for standing. Cf. Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Legal Probabilities Created 
Equal?, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980, 985–86 (2009) (discussing the probabilistic nature of uncertain law). 
94
  412 U.S. 669, 678 (1973). 
95
  Id. at 675–76. 
96
  Id. at 688. 
97
  See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 548 n.2 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing 
the “attenuated nature of the injury” in SCRAP). The Court subsequently recognized in Whitmore v. 
Arkansas that the string of probabilities in SCRAP rendered the alleged injury “attenuated.” 495 U.S. 
149, 158 (1990). But in doing so, the Whitmore Court did not conclude that the probabilities were not so 
remote as to make the claim in SCRAP plausible. Instead, the Court switched gears, justifying SCRAP 
on the ground that “the string of occurrences alleged [c]ould happen immediately.” Id. at 159. That the 
injury could happen immediately, however, does not establish that the injury is likely to happen. 
98
  SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 690. 
99
  504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
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harm.100 The petitioners based their standing on the claim that they intended 
to go to the foreign countries to see the endangered animals and that the 
regulation would impair their ability to do so.101 The Court denied standing 
on the ground that the petitioners did not specify when they intended to go 
to those countries.102 The fact that the petitioners did not specify a particular 
date does tend to reduce the probability that they would indeed go to those 
foreign countries, but their averment that they had every intention of going 
still seems to create a realistic probability that they would eventually go. Of 
course, even if the petitioners went to those countries, there was uncertainty 
whether they would be unable to see the animals because of the regulation. 
But it is difficult to say that the probability of harm was clearly lower than 
the probability of harm in SCRAP.  
One likely explanation for courts’ failure to assess probabilistic injuries 
rigorously is that courts often must make their assessment without adequate 
information about the probabilities of harm. Probabilities are predictions 
about future events, and those predictions themselves are often imprecise.103 
Doctors may agree, for example, that secondhand exposure to cigarette 
smoke increases the risk of developing cancer, but they do not agree on the 
precise amount of risk increase. Similar unknowns plague many other areas 
of risk assessment. Consider global warming, the threat of nuclear 
meltdown, the chances of entering into an economic recession, and the 
likelihood that a house will be devoured by termites—all risks that 
undeniably exist, but whose size is a matter of dispute. 
Uncertainty about probability forces courts to forego precise 
calculations of probabilities and instead to evaluate probability on a gestalt 
feeling of the likelihood of a harm occurring. Assessments of this sort, 
however, are vulnerable to biases. One such bias is the availability 
heuristic, which leads people to have a heightened fear of a risk of harm if 
an example of that harm occurring readily comes to mind.104 This heuristic 
suggests that decisions about whether a threat of injury is adequate may 
depend more on an individual judge’s personal experiences and biases than 
 
100
  Id. at 558–59. 
101
  Id. at 563–64. 
102
  Id. at 564. 
103
  See generally Hillel J. Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth, Ambiguity and Uncertainty in Probabilistic 
Inference, 92 PSYCHOL. REV. 433 (1985) (describing uncertainty about uncertainty). 
104
  See Norbert Schwarz & Leigh Ann Vaughn, The Availability Heuristic Revisited: Ease of Recall 
and Content of Recall as Distinct Sources of Information, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 103, 103 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman 
eds., 2002); see also Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate 
Change, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 534 (2007) (discussing the practical impact of the heuristic). Other 
considerations influence perceptions of risks. For example, one study concludes that the expressive 
function of law may lead people to have heightened perceptions of the risk of avoiding conviction 
arising from a lack of clarity in the law, as compared to the risk of avoiding conviction from uncertain 
enforcement. See Feldman & Teichman, supra note 93. 
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actual probabilities.105 This may explain in part the Court’s willingness to 
find standing in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental 
Services (TOC), Inc.,106 but its refusal to do so in City of Los Angeles v. 
Lyons.107 In Laidlaw, the plaintiffs brought suit against a company because 
of the alleged risk of harm from the discharge of pollutants into a river 
waterway, even though the plaintiffs conceded that continual past emissions 
had not caused them harm.108 In Lyons, the plaintiff had previously been 
choked by police and alleged that he might again be subject to a police 
chokehold.109 No doubt, the Justices, who were law-abiding property 
owners, could more easily relate to property damage from emissions than to 
experiencing a chokehold while being arrested. 
These cognitive biases are likely not the only extraneous factors that 
influence probability determinations. Given the entirely inadequate 
information courts must use to evaluate risk, it seems likely that a variety of 
considerations other than the size of the threat of injury creep into courts’ 
standing determinations for claims of unlikely future injuries. Although 
framing their decisions in terms of whether a threat is speculative or not, 
courts may actually base their standing decisions on matters such as 
separation of powers, federalism, efficiency, docket size, or some other 
concern. This, too, may provide some explanation of the decisions in Lyons 
and Laidlaw. In Lyons, the plaintiff sought an injunction against the Los 
Angeles police,110 but the suit in Laidlaw was against a private company.111 
The denial of standing in Lyons and the grant of standing in Laidlaw may 
reflect the Court’s unwillingness to interfere in the workings of state 
government.112 This is not to say that the Justices consciously based their 
decisions on these considerations. But the point remains that the current 
doctrine is sufficiently vague that courts may easily justify deciding many 
cases either way, and those decisions may be influenced by a number of 
factors other than the size of the risk of injury. 
 
105
  Cf. Nichol, supra note 60, at 332 (arguing that Justices reach conclusions about adequacy of 
injury based on personal experience and intuition). 
106
  528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
107
  461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
108
  528 U.S. at 181–84, 199. 
109
  461 U.S. at 97–98. 
110
  Id. at 99–100. 
111
  528 U.S. at 173. 
112
  See Fallon, supra note 7, at 648 (arguing that justiciability rulings may depend on concerns 
about interfering with the government). The Laidlaw majority distinguished Lyons on the ground that in 
Lyons it was speculative whether the harm would ever “take place,” while in Laidlaw it was clear that 
the illegal activity―the discharge of pollutants―would continue. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184. But the 
continuance or not of the illegal activity is not the relevant question. Rather, the question is whether 
there is any injury from that activity, and in Laidlaw, there had not been injury from the ongoing 
activity. 
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Extending Article III jurisdiction to all threats of injury would largely 
solve these problems. Judges would no longer face the prospect of guessing 
based on insufficient information whether a particular risk is adequately 
substantial, and litigants would no longer face the prospect of decisions 
being rendered based on biases and considerations other than the threshold 
of the injury.113 
III. ADDRESSING OTHER REASONS FOR EXCLUDING SMALL RISKS OF 
INJURY UNDER ARTICLE III 
Although a low probability of injury presents a dispute capable of 
judicial resolution, there may be other reasons to interpret Article III in a 
way that does not extend to those claims. For example, one might argue that 
the historical backdrop against which Article III was written establishes that 
the Framers did not intend federal courts to be empowered to hear disputes 
based on small risks of harm. Or one might think that ruling on low-
probability injuries runs afoul of the restriction on advisory opinions or 
violates separation of powers in other ways. Another possible objection is 
that extending standing to all potential injuries would overwhelm the 
federal courts with litigation. This Part considers those arguments. 
A. Historical Equity 
The Supreme Court has explained that the case-or-controversy 
requirement limits the judicial power to deciding those disputes 
“traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process.”114 
Historically, courts did not have the power to award relief for all threatened 
injuries. Instead, according to Mitford’s 1782 treatise on equity, courts 
would enter an injunction only when the plaintiff faced a “probable ground 
of possible injury.”115 Justice Johnson articulated the same standard in 1792, 
stating that a plaintiff must confront a “probable danger” of injury,116 as did 
Justice Story in his Commentaries on Equity Pleadings, in which he states 
that an injunction is appropriate to prevent “a probable ground of possible 
 
113
  This is not to say that courts must exercise jurisdiction for all claims of any potential risk. As 
discussed infra Part IV, one might create a system under which, even though they possess Article III 
jurisdiction, courts may decline to exercise that jurisdiction based on the cost of the remedy, the effect of 
exercising jurisdiction on the government, or a host of other costs. 
114
  Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774 (2000) (quoting 
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998) (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
115
  JOHN MITFORD & SAMUEL TYLER, MITFORD’S AND TYLER’S PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE IN 
EQUITY: A TREATISE ON THE PLEADINGS IN SUITS IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY BY ENGLISH BILL 106 
(5th ed. 1890); accord JOHN MITFORD, A TREATISE ON THE PLEADINGS IN SUITS IN THE COURT OF 
CHANCERY BY ENGLISH BILL 8 (2d ed. 1787). 
116
  Georgia v. Braislford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402, 405 (1792) (Johnson, J.).  
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injury.”117 Other historical sources espoused a similar view.118 Thus, it was 
not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the injury necessarily would 
occur. But when an injury was unlikely to occur, relief would be denied.119 
It may be that these historical limitations on equity are the original 
source of standing law’s minimum-risk requirement.120 But even so, the 
Supreme Court has separated Article III from equity in more recent times. 
Since the 1930s, the Court has held that Article III does not confine the 
judiciary to the traditional forms of equity. Thus, in Aetna Life Insurance 
Co. v. Haworth,121 the Court rejected the argument that Article III did not 
permit the issuance of a declaratory judgment, explaining that Article III 
“did not crystallize into changeless form the procedure of 1789 as the only 
possible means for presenting a case or controversy.”122 
Moreover, recent cases suggest that standing imposes a lower threshold 
than that historically required for an injunction. One example is 
Massachusetts v. EPA.123 There, Massachusetts challenged the EPA’s 
refusal to issue a rule regulating emissions that allegedly contribute to 
global warming.124 Massachusetts claimed standing on the ground that 
global warming could threaten the loss of land from rising sea levels by the 
 
117
  1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS, AND THE INCIDENTS THEREOF, 
ACCORDING TO THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF EQUITY OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA, ch. 2, § 9, at 9 
(10th ed. 1892). 
118
  See, e.g., City of Rochester v. Curtiss, Cl. Ch. 336, 339 (N.Y. Ch. 1840) (“In cases of doubtful 
right or remote and contingent injury, this court will wait for the right to be settled at law or the injury to 
become imminent, before it will interfere with its extraordinary process of injunction.”); Coalter v. 
Hunter, 25 Va. (4 Rand.) 58, 66 (1826) (“If [plaintiff] had been in the actual enjoyment of the use of the 
water, and had reasonable ground to apprehend that [defendant] intended to deprive him of that 
enjoyment, an application to the Chancellor to prevent this threatened injury, might have been proper.”); 
Bush v. Western, (1720) 24 Eng. Rep. 237 (K.B.) 237–38 (refusing to grant relief to a mortgage holder, 
as opposed to a land possessor, for potential damage to property since the holder did not face a sufficient 
probability of injury); 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, JR., A TREATISE ON EQUITABLE REMEDIES; 
SUPPLEMENTARY TO POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 523, at 888 (1905) (stating that “a mere 
possibility of a future nuisance will not support an injunction,” but nor is it necessary to prove “that the 
nuisance will occur”; rather, “it is sufficient . . . that the risk of its happening is greater than a reasonable 
man would incur” (first emphasis added)).  
119
  See Clinton Liberal Inst. v. Fletcher, 55 How. Pr. 431, 432 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1878); 3 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *225 (“[H]e, who hath the remainder for life only, is not entitled to sue 
for waste; since his interest may never perhaps come into possession, and then he hath suffered no 
injury.”). 
120
  The Court has also justified the hearing of future injuries under Article III on the ground that 
historically courts could hear such claims. See Vicksburg Waterworks Co. v. Vicksburg, 185 U.S. 65, 82 
(1902) (holding that a threatened injury presented a case because “one of the most valuable features of 
equity jurisdiction[] [is] to anticipate and prevent a threatened injury, where the damages would be 
insufficient or irreparable”). 
121
  300 U.S. 227 (1937). 
122
  Id. at 240 (quoting Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 
(1933)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
123
  549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
124
  Id. at 514. 
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end of the twenty-first century.125 But traditionally, injunctions were not 
available to prevent harms on such a time horizon. In the nineteenth-century 
case Fletcher v. Bealey, a paper mill, which operated on a river and 
depended on pure water for its operation, sought an injunction against a 
plant that was discharging substantial quantities of sulfuric “vat waste” 
upstream.126 The court denied injunctive relief.127 Although acknowledging 
that within ten years the water “would be polluted sufficiently to do a great 
amount of injury to the Plaintiff,” the court explained that by that time 
advances in technology might prevent the damage.128 If the limitations of 
equity defined the scope of Article III, Fletcher would suggest that 
Massachusetts lacked standing in Massachusetts v. EPA. But the 
Massachusetts v. EPA Court found standing based on the threatened loss of 
coastal land, even though advances in technology might have prevented the 
damage. 
Most important, the reasons underlying the constitutional doctrine of 
standing are not the same as those underlying the limitations on injunctive 
relief. Under current understanding, the main reason for standing is to 
preserve separation of powers.129 More functional concerns motivate the 
restrictions on injunctive relief. The ancient Court of Chancery did not have 
the same degree of concern about separation of powers because the court 
was acting on behalf of the Crown.130 The reason for the probable harm 
requirement was to preserve judicial resources by refusing to issue 
injunctions except when necessary and to avoid placing unnecessary 
burdens on parties.131 
The doctrine of ripeness most clearly illustrates the distinction between 
the probability requirements of equity and Article III. Ripeness has both 
 
125
  Id. at 541–542 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that one harm supporting standing was the 
possible loss of land in the next few decades). 
126
  (1885) 28 Ch. 688 at 693–95 (Eng.).  
127
  Id. at 700. 
128
  Id. at 699–700; see also Attorney Gen. v. Kingston-on-Thames, (1865) 34 H.L. 481 at 487 
(Eng.) (refusing to enjoin the town of Kingston from dumping sewage into the Thames on the ground 
that that any harm from dumping might not arise for “a hundred years hence”). 
129
  See Hessick, supra note 17, at 296. 
130
  DAVID LINDSAY KEIR, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN SINCE 1485, at 29 
(9th ed. 1969) (“[C]ontact between the Crown and its judges was close and . . . the judges reckoned 
themselves very fully its servants.”); see also id. at 142. That said, beginning in the seventeenth century, 
England did recognize some authority of the courts to check the Crown. See Roscoe Pound, The End of 
Law as Developed in Juristic Thought, 27 HARV. L. REV. 605, 622 (1914) (noting “the victory of the 
courts in the contests between courts and crown in seventeenth-century England”). 
131
  See Gene R. Shreve, Federal Injunctions and the Public Interest, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 382, 
419 (1983) (“For a court to issue an injunction without finding the probability of imminent harm is 
wasteful of scarce judicial resources.”); Developments in the Law—Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 
1005–08 (1965) (explaining that the imminence requirement derives from a desire to avoid overly 
regulating conduct). 
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constitutional and prudential components.132 As noted earlier, the 
constitutional component mirrors the imminence requirement of standing; a 
party must face a sufficiently immediate threat of injury that presents an 
actual controversy.133 The prudential component extends beyond this 
constitutional core. It aims to improve the decisionmaking process and to 
avoid the unnecessary expenditure of judicial resources.134 These are 
precisely the functional concerns underlying the hesitancy of federal courts 
to grant injunctions based on remote harms.135 
Courts have also treated requirements for an injunction more flexibly 
than those for standing. In determining whether to grant an injunction, 
courts consider the severity of an alleged harm together with the likelihood 
that the harm will occur.136 The greater the threatened harm, the less the 
required showing of the harm’s likelihood of occurring.137 By contrast, in 
determining whether a risk of injury is sufficient, courts have generally not 
inquired into the severity of the threatened harm alleged.138 Instead, they 
have considered the likelihood of the injury occurring independent from the 
nature of the harm. Whatever the threatened injury—be it a chokehold that 
can result in permanent physical damage,139 the impairment of the ability to 
view and enjoy animals,140 the destruction of coastline,141 the deprivation of 
hospital services,142 or the death penalty143—courts have employed the same 
probability requirements, asking only whether the risks of injury are 
realistic and imminent, without factoring in the gravity of the harm. 
B. Advisory Opinions 
Another possible objection to the any-risk-of-harm standard is that 
allowing standing based on any threat of injury potentially runs afoul of the 
restriction on advisory opinions. Courts and commentators have disagreed 
 
132
  See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767 n.2 (2010) (quoting 
Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993)). 
133
  See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
134
  See Nichol, supra note 40, at 176 (detailing the prudential uses of ripeness). 
135
  See Hotel & Rest. Emps. Union, Local 25 v. Attorney Gen., 804 F.2d 1256, 1277 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 
1986) (Silberman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the prudential aspects of 
ripeness derive from equity), vacated, 846 F.2d 1499 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc). 
136
  See, e.g., Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(describing a “sliding scale” of likelihood and severity of harm). 
137
  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 933(1) cmt. b (1977) (“The more serious the impending 
harm, the less justification there is for taking the chances that are involved in pronouncing the harm too 
remote.”). 
138
  See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
139
  City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 97–99 (1983). 
140
  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–63 (1992). 
141
  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521 (2007). 
142
  Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 43 (1976). 
143
  Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 156–57 (1990). 
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on the precise definition of an advisory opinion.144 An expansive definition 
is that an advisory opinion encompasses a judicial decision that has no 
effect in the real world.145 Under this definition, a decision on a claim based 
on an extremely-low-probability injury would arguably be an advisory 
opinion because resolving the claim would require the court to provide 
relief from an injury that is almost certain not to occur and thus likely to 
have no real-world effect. 
This is the view that the Supreme Court espoused in United Public 
Workers of America (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell.146 There, several federal employees 
who sought to participate in political campaigns brought suit challenging 
the potential enforcement of the Hatch Act, which prohibits federal 
employees from participating in political campaigns.147 The Court dismissed 
the claim of all appellants (with the exception of George P. Poole, the only 
appellant who had actually violated the Hatch Act) for lack of 
jurisdiction.148 It explained that, to exercise jurisdiction, plaintiffs had to 
allege not simply the “general threat” that officials might enforce the Act 
against them, but a “direct threat of punishment” for violating that law.149 
According to the Court, any opinion to redress a “hypothetical threat,” as 
opposed to an actual controversy, would be merely an “advisory opinion.”150 
But Mitchell’s characterization of a decision where the probability of 
injury was low as an advisory opinion is unwarranted. Resolving a claim 
based on a low probability of injury does have a real-world effect. Even 
when the threat of injury is extremely low, a judicial decision targeted at 
that threat might reduce, or even remove, the threat. Consider the situation 
where a person faces a 0.005% chance of cancer because of a factory’s 
emissions. Although the chance of developing cancer from the emissions is 
low, an injunction ordering the factory to reduce its emissions will still 
reduce the plaintiff’s chance of developing cancer from those emissions. 
Moreover, the expansive definition of an advisory opinion relied on by 
Mitchell is too broad.151 Mitchell does not explain why a decision addressing 
a remote threat of injury constitutes an advisory opinion. Instead, it simply 
equates advisory opinions with lack of standing because of a low 
 
144
  See Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105 HARV. 
L. REV. 603, 643–45 (1992) (noting different uses of the term “advisory opinion”). 
145
  See, e.g., Jennifer Mason McAward, Congress’s Power to Block Enforcement of Federal Court 
Orders, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1319, 1344 (2008) (arguing that “judicial intervention” that has “no real-world 
effect” is “tantamount to an advisory opinion”). 
146
  330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947). 
147
  Id. at 81–82. 
148
  Id. at 83, 91. 
149
  Id. at 88. 
150
  Id. at 89–90. 
151
  See Lee, supra note 144, at 643–44. 
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probability of injury.152 Indeed, in subsequent opinions, the Supreme Court 
itself has interpreted Mitchell as a standing decision.153 Presumably, if the 
Court deemed that the threat of injury was sufficiently substantial to support 
standing, it would not have determined that a decision would constitute an 
advisory opinion. Thus, Mitchell does not establish a separate jurisdictional 
restriction for advisory opinions; rather, it limits jurisdiction only to the 
extent there is not standing. 
Indeed, as Professor Evan Tsen Lee has persuasively demonstrated, the 
restriction on advisory opinions properly encompasses only two 
situations.154 The first is when a court issues a judgment that is subject to 
review by another branch.155 This form of the advisory opinion derives from 
the 1792 decision in Hayburn’s Case.156 That case involved a statutory 
pension scheme for disabled Revolutionary War veterans.157 Under the 
statute, a disabled veteran submitted an application for benefits to the 
federal court.158 The court was to determine whether the veteran was entitled 
to benefits, but instead of ordering benefits itself, it was to transmit its 
conclusions to the Secretary of War, who made the final decision whether 
to award benefits.159 Sitting on circuit, Chief Justice Jay and Justices Iredell, 
Cushing, Wilson, and Blair explained that the scheme violated separation of 
powers by undermining the independence of the judiciary.160 Since 
Hayburn’s Case, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the 
Constitution forbids courts from issuing judgments subject to revision by 
another body.161 This first form of advisory opinion does not pose an 
 
152
  Cf. id. at 645 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s use of the term “advisory opinion” merely on the 
basis of lack of standing). 
153
  City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (relying on Mitchell for the proposition 
that a plaintiff has standing only if he faces an immediate threat of injury); see also Golden v. Zwickler, 
394 U.S. 103, 109–10 (1969) (general interest in constitutionality of law is not an actual controversy). 
Even cases predating Mitchell that address insufficient injury speak in terms of standing instead of 
advisory opinions. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, for example, the Court concluded that it lacked 
jurisdiction to hear a challenge to a statute by an individual unaffected by the statute on the ground that 
the plaintiff must show “that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct 
injury as the result of its enforcement.” 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923); see also Ex parte Lévitt, 302 U.S. 
633, 633–34 (1937) (per curiam) (using similar language to reject a challenge to the appointment of 
Justice Black).  
154
  Lee, supra note 144, at 644–51 (explaining why advisory opinions do not encompass all 
justiciability doctrines); see also Frankfurter, supra note 82, at 1004 (limiting advisory opinions to 
situations in which the courts rule prematurely on the constitutionality of a statute). 
155
  Lee, supra note 144, at 645–46. 
156
  2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). 
157
  Id. at 409–10. 
158
  Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 243, 243–44 (repealed in part and amended by Act of Feb. 
28, 1793, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 324, 324–325). 
159
  2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 410 n.†; see also 1 Stat. at 244. 
160
  The opinion is reproduced in a footnote in Hayburn’s Case. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 410 n.†. 
161
  See, e.g., Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948) 
(“Judgments within the powers vested in courts by the Judiciary Article of the Constitution may not 
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obstacle to cases alleging a low probability of injury; the likelihood of an 
injury is irrelevant to whether the President or Congress can review a 
judicial decision. 
The second type of advisory opinion is one in which a court provides 
advice to Congress on potential legislation before it is enacted or to the 
President regarding how a law should be interpreted before it is enforced.162 
The Supreme Court first recognized that such opinions were forbidden in 
1793 when it refused to answer President Washington’s questions about 
France’s rights under various treaties.163 
This second form of advisory opinion potentially poses an obstacle to 
the exercise of federal court jurisdiction based on a small risk of harm. 
There is always a chance, though it may be miniscule, that a legislature will 
enact a statute that could injure an individual. Allowing absolutely any risk 
of injury to support standing would mean that an individual could challenge 
any potential future law before its enactment. Issuing an injunction against 
the enforcement of such a potential statute would amount to pre-enactment 
review and, consequently, would violate the restriction on advisory 
opinions. But this does not mean that federal courts generally cannot hear 
claims alleging small risks of harm; rather, it means only that federal courts 
lack jurisdiction over pre-enactment challenges to legislation. 
Unlike challenges to legislation before enactment, the restriction on 
providing advice to the President does not bar jurisdiction over a claim 
because it alleges a small threat of injury.164 This restriction does not 
generally prohibit courts from providing pre-enforcement interpretations of 
laws; it merely prevents the President from seeking such interpretations.165 
Private parties do not face a similar limitation. Federal courts routinely 
interpret statutes before they have been enforced at the instigation of private 
parties.166 Thus, this form of advisory opinion does not depend on the 
 
lawfully be revised, overturned or refused faith and credit by another Department of Government.”); 
United States v. O’Grady, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 641, 647–48 (1874) (“Judicial jurisdiction implies the 
power to hear and determine a cause, and . . . Congress cannot subject the judgments of the Supreme 
Court to the re-examination and revision of any other tribunal . . . .”); see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 
Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 225–27 (1995) (forbidding Congress from directing reopening of decided cases). 
162
  Lee, supra note 144, at 644–45, 647; see also Frankfurter, supra note 83, at 1004. 
163
  Letter from Chief Justice Jay and Associate Justices to President Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), in 
3 CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 1782–1793, at 488 (Henry P. Johnston ed., 
1891). 
164
  Moreover, this restriction on advisory opinions has no bearing on many claims of low-
probability injuries. That is because this form of advisory opinion implicates only those laws that the 
Executive branch enforces. For laws that the President has no role in enforcing―such as state laws and 
federal laws creating private causes of action―the prohibition on advisory opinions poses no barrier. 
165
  Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 827–28 (1997) (indicating that the President and legislators 
cannot resort to the courts for clarification of law). 
166
  See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733, 2742 (2011) (striking down 
California law regulating the sale or rental of violent video games based on a pre-enforcement 
challenge). 
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quality of the injury. Rather, it turns on who is bringing suit—the President 
or a private individual—regardless of the type of injury alleged.167 
To be sure, allowing suits based on low-probability injuries may 
require a court to interpret a law before it is enforced, as in the situation 
where an individual brings a declaratory judgment action seeking an 
interpretation of a law that is unlikely to be enforced against him. But 
unlike ruling on legislation before enactment, which poses the threat that 
the courts will interfere in the legislative process, providing interpretations 
based on hypothetical disputes does not present serious separation-of-
powers concerns. Interpreting the law, unlike legislating, is the province of 
the judiciary.168 For this reason, courts have repeatedly concluded that 
Article III does not pose an absolute bar to interpretations of laws pre-
enforcement in the course of issuing injunctions and declaratory 
judgments.169 A suit alleging a low probability of injury is not different in 
kind from these actions: both involve the courts providing an interpretation 
before the executive acts. 
One might try to argue that low-probability injuries are somehow 
different because they call for interpretations based on more hypothetical 
facts. But courts often render interpretations of both statutes and the 
Constitution based on hypothetical facts.170 The most striking example is in 
an overbreadth challenge to a law on the ground that it violates the First 
Amendment. For such challenges, the court determines the constitutionality 
of the statute by considering whether the statute might impair the First 
 
167
  Although the Constitution does not prohibit courts from rendering opinions on hypothetical 
facts, there are several more practical reasons for courts to avoid rendering interpretations in 
hypothetical cases, including ensuring that there is a concrete factual background against which the 
court resolves the legal question and to preserve judicial resources. See infra Part IV; see also 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 45, § 2.2, at 49. Both of these considerations are prudential, and may be 
outweighed by other considerations in particular cases or may simply be overridden by Congress. Thus, 
courts could more sensibly account for these considerations in a discretionary test, as detailed below in 
Part IV. 
168
  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
169
  See Vicksburg Waterworks Co. v. Vicksburg, 185 U.S. 65, 82 (1902) (holding that a threatened 
injury presented a case because “one of the most valuable features of equity jurisdiction[] [is] to 
anticipate and prevent a threatened injury, where the damages would be insufficient or irreparable”); see 
also, e.g., Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1329–31 (2010) 
(considering an as-applied pre-enforcement challenge brought under the First Amendment). 
170
  See, e.g., United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 1006–07 (9th Cir. 
2009) (providing a “guidepost” for future cases), revised and superseded, 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(en banc); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 622–23 (1961) (explaining theories of coerced 
confession unrelated to the case). Likewise, courts routinely render interpretations of statutes and the 
Constitution when it is unnecessary to do so. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) 
(suggesting that courts resolve whether officials violated the Constitution in suits brought under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 even when doing so may be unnecessary because of qualified immunity); Marbury, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) at 154–73 (resolving merits of mandamus petition despite finding no jurisdiction). 
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Amendment rights of other hypothetical people not before the court.171 The 
fact that courts do so demonstrates that Article III does not prohibit the 
practice. 
In short, the restriction on advisory opinions does not bar the 
adjudication of low-threat injuries generally. To the extent it does so at all, 
it is only in the context of challenges to hypothetical legislation. 
C. Separation of Powers 
The objection about advisory opinions is just one example of a broader 
concern that extending standing to low-probability injuries potentially 
violates separation of powers. Under the Court’s current theory of 
separation of powers, the Legislative and Executive branches have the task 
of establishing social policy through the enactment and enforcement of 
laws.172 The courts, by contrast, do not have a similar policy role; their 
function is to resolve the rights of individuals.173 Given this understanding 
of the appropriate allocation of powers, one might argue that extending 
jurisdiction to cases in which a plaintiff has alleged only a miniscule risk of 
injury will lead to courts resolving policy matters more properly answered 
by the other branches.174 
This separation-of-powers concern has significantly influenced 
standing doctrine.175 For example, the Supreme Court has refused to 
recognize standing for generalized grievances common to all members of 
the public—such as harm arising from the government’s failure to obey the 
law176—based on the conclusion that the Legislature or Executive is the 
 
171
  See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003) (justifying overbreadth on the ground that 
the costs of unconstitutional limitations on speech of those not before the court warrant suspending all 
enforcement of the law); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769–70 (1982) (stating that a statute is 
constitutionally overbroad if it affects a “substantial” amount of protected conduct). 
172
  Indeed, as then-Professor Frankfurter noted, the consideration of probabilities is central to the 
legislative process. Frankfurter, supra note 83, at 1005 (“[L]egislation to a considerable extent must 
necessarily be based on probabilities, on hopes and fears, and not on demonstration.”). In enacting a law, 
legislators must predict the need for and consequences of that legislation. 
173
  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992). Although courts may create policy 
through their decisions, they may do so only in the course of resolving a dispute about rights. 
174
  Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 476–77 (2008). Whether all 
individuals will have access to courts depends on the generality of the definition of an injury. If an 
injury is defined generally, more people will be likely to face that injury. For example, if the injury is 
discrimination on the basis of race, all people may face that injury since anyone may be discriminated 
against on the basis of his race. But if the injury is narrowly defined to be discrimination against Asians, 
only Asians face that injury―though even in that case, standing is arguably appropriate since there is 
some chance, however small, that a white person could suffer discrimination based on the wrong 
conclusion that he is Asian. 
175
  Id. 
176
  See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577–78 (concluding that a private individual does not have standing 
to challenge executive’s failure to obey law); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 
U.S. 208, 220–21 (1974) (denying standing to individuals challenging congressmen holding office while 
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appropriate body to redress an injury shared by the entire public.177 
Similarly, the Court has held that taxpayer status alone cannot confer 
standing, explaining that to extend standing to all taxpayers would convert 
the courts into fora for anyone seeking to challenge any government policy, 
thereby resulting in the courts becoming the overseers of the political 
branches.178  
Under the Court’s vision of separation of powers, the role of the courts 
is to vindicate the interests of individuals who suffer distinct, personalized 
injuries.179 As Justice Scalia has explained, when a majority of people share 
an injury, that group may resort to the political process.180 Judicial relief is 
appropriate only to protect minorities who cannot rely on the political 
process.181 
One might think that this vision of separation of powers demands that 
standing should not extend to small risks of injury. After all, everyone has 
at least some probability of facing an injury; thus, if the probability 
threshold for standing is set sufficiently low, everyone has standing to 
challenge any action.182 But this concern does not justify the minimum-risk 
requirement. 
 
being commissioned in the military in violation of Art. I, § 6, cl. 2); United States v. Richardson, 418 
U.S. 166, 177 (1974) (holding that a private individual lacks standing to challenge Congress’s failure to 
publish the CIA’s expenditures as required under Art. I, § 9, cl. 7); see also Elliott, supra note 174 
(discussing this line of cases). 
177
  See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577 (arguing that granting standing would undermine the President’s 
power to take care that the laws are enforced); Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179 (noting that interest in 
government obedience to the law “is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the 
political process”); Newman v. United States ex rel. Frizzell, 238 U.S. 537, 547–48 (1915) (stating that 
although “every citizen and every taxpayer is interested in the enforcement of law . . . that general 
interest is not a private but a public interest . . . to be represented by the Attorney General or the District 
Attorney”). 
178
  Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 593, 599–600 (2007); Massachusetts 
v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486–87 (1923) (holding that taxpayers lacked standing under the Tenth 
Amendment to challenge federal funding of health programs for mothers and children).  
179
  Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 
17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 895–97 (1983).  
180
  Id. 
181
  Id. Justice Scalia’s defense of standing law fails to account for all of the Court’s decisions, for 
the Court has invoked separation of powers in denying standing for concrete and particularized injuries. 
In Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), for example, the Court held that black plaintiffs did not have 
standing based on the stigma resulting from discrimination against other blacks. Id. at 761. Although 
stigmatization is a real injury, the Court explained that recognition of stigma as sufficient injury would 
extend standing to “all members of a racial group,” id. at 754, converting the courts into “virtually 
continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness” of policy choices, id. at 759–60 (quoting Laird v. 
Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)). Likewise, in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for 
Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, (1982), the Court rejected standing based on 
psychological distress caused by the government’s illegal conduct, although that distress was a very real 
injury. Id. at 484. 
182
  See Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 513 F.3d 234, 242 (D.C. Cir. 
2008) (Sentelle, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that allowing standing based on probabilistic 
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Even under the modern Court’s vision of separation of powers, the 
restriction on low-risk injuries is unwarranted. First, even for an injury that 
is unlikely to occur, different groups face different risks of suffering that 
injury. One group may face an extremely low probability of injury, but that 
probability may still be substantially higher than the probability of injury 
faced by other individuals. For example, people who live in a town near 
high-tension power lines face a higher probability―though the probability 
is still low―of developing cancer from those power lines than those who 
live further away. Although the town residents face small risks of injury, 
their risk might still be significant when compared to the threat facing the 
general population. Because of this difference in relative risk, the town 
residents constitute a minority. The minimum-risk requirement therefore 
closes the court doors to those who are in a minority in the sense used by 
Justice Scalia.183 
Further, the fact that the minimum-risk requirement may extend 
standing to virtually everyone for all injuries does not conflict with the 
Court’s separation of powers theory. As the Court has recognized, some 
widespread injuries may support standing. For example, an individual who 
suffers a burned arm in a fire has standing even if that fire also burned 
thousands of others.184 Although the injury is widespread, standing is 
appropriate because each burn victim suffers a particularized, personal 
injury.185 This analysis should extend to risk of injury. If the threatened 
injury is particularized, the risk of that injury is also particularized. Each 
plaintiff faces a personal interest in preventing the threatened injury. Just as 
a plaintiff who develops cancer as a result of tortious conduct that also 
affects thousands of others has suffered a personal injury, so too a plaintiff 
who faces a risk of cancer from that same tort has a personalized injury—
the risk of developing cancer. 
Even to the extent that prohibiting standing for low-risk injuries does 
protect some aspect of separation of powers insofar as it restricts the 
judiciary’s ability to act, this prohibition undermines other aspects of 
separation of powers by impairing legislative powers. The Constitution 
charges Congress with creating rights through legislative enactments. The 
minimum-risk requirement, however, restricts this congressional power to 
 
harm results in courts “looking more and more like legislatures rather than courts”), supplemented by 
513 F.3d 234 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 
183
  This is not to say that only those who are in this minority should have standing; to the contrary, 
all those who face a risk of harm should have standing. Rather, the point is that the minimum-risk 
requirement does not achieve the separation-of-power goals articulated by the Court because it bars suit 
by those in the minority. It is particularly important to recognize this point given that people routinely 
face different risks of suffering the same harm because of their daily activities, geography, genetic 
predisposition, and other factors. There accordingly will almost always be some group of people facing 
a greater risk than the general populace. 
184
  FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998); accord id. at 36 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
185
  Id. 
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create judicially enforceable rights; courts will recognize a right only when 
there is a sufficiently high probability of the violation of that right.186 
Because a right has practical effect only to the extent that it is vindicated,187 
the minimum-risk requirement functionally redefines the scope of rights. 
For practical purposes, the minimum-risk requirement limits the scope of 
the rights that Congress may create. Under the requirement, Congress 
cannot pursue a policy of preventing extremely low-risk injuries through 
private causes of action; courts will not entertain such actions unless they 
cross the judicially created Article III threshold of risk. 
Likewise, the minimum-risk requirement interferes with administrative 
programs. Congress often tasks agencies with minimizing the risks of 
particular types of harm and leaves it to the courts to ensure that the 
agencies fulfill this goal.188 The Administrative Procedure Act and other 
statutes afford individuals the right to challenge agency actions that fall 
short.189 This scheme reduces agency power by empowering the public to 
seek judicial enforcement and provides an independent body—the 
judiciary—to ensure that the agency acts in accordance with its delegated 
power.190 Prohibiting standing for low risks of injury undermines this 
scheme. An agency may promulgate a regulation that reduces the risk of 
harm, but not to the degree intended by Congress. By refusing to extend 
standing to these low-level risks prohibited by Congress, the courts displace 
 
186
  It is not uncommon for Congress to regulate conduct to prevent low-risk injuries; indeed, 
because of cognitive biases, Congress may regulate to prevent low-risk events—such as airplane 
crashes—more readily than to prevent high-risk events—such as heart disease. See generally CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2002) (discussing the rationality 
of risk regulation). 
187
  See In re The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 433 (1922) (“Legal obligations that exist but cannot 
be enforced are ghosts that are seen in the law but that are elusive to the grasp.”); Daryl J. Levinson, 
Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 858 (1999) (“Rights are 
dependent on remedies not just for their application to the real world, but for their scope, shape, and 
very existence.”). 
188
  The Safe Drinking Water Act is an example. It requires the EPA to set “maximum contaminant 
level goals” for water contaminants at a level at which no known adverse health consequences will 
occur, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(4)(A) (2006), and then to establish regulations for each contaminant 
designed to achieve these goals to the extent feasible, id. § 300g-1(b)(4)(B). Of course, Congress may 
direct an agency to disregard trivial risks. See Cass R. Sunstein, Is OSHA Unconstitutional?, 94 VA. L. 
REV. 1407, 1408–09 (2008). 
189
  See Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237, 243 (1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 702 
(2006)) (generally authorizing review of administrative actions); see also, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1848 (2006) 
(authorizing review of actions of the Federal Reserve Board); 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2006) (authorizing 
review of actions of the NLRB). 
190
  CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 
143 (1990) (“Broad delegations of power to regulatory agencies, questionable in light of the grant of 
legislative power to Congress in Article I of the Constitution, have been allowed largely on the 
assumption that courts would be available to ensure agency fidelity to whatever statutory directives have 
been issued.”). 
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Congress’s legislative choices by permitting risks that Congress has deemed 
intolerable. 
Finally, the limits on probabilistic standing exacerbate inequalities in 
our democratic system that separation of powers was designed to prevent. 
One function of the courts is to serve as a forum for those who lack political 
power.191 But the limitations on standing set up the opposite scheme. 
Regulated entities often have substantially more influence in Congress than 
does the general public,192 and they have standing to challenge regulations 
to which they are subject because those regulations affect their bottom 
line.193 It is the general public that faces standing problems because of the 
restrictions on low probabilities of injuries. 
D. Caseload 
A fourth objection to expanding standing to all risks of injury is that it 
would open the floodgates of litigation and overburden the federal dockets. 
Many activities marginally increase virtually everybody’s risk of suffering a 
particular type of harm, and consequently anyone could bring suit to 
challenge those activities. 
Although expanding standing may indeed increase the federal docket, 
that increase is unlikely to be substantial. To start, the expansion of 
standing doctrine would not necessarily result in significantly more suits. 
Common sense and experience suggest that many people who already have 
standing to bring suit do not do so. Individuals often privately resolve their 
disputes,194 or they simply live with the wrong done to them on the theory 
that the costs of bringing suit are not worthwhile.195 In a substantial number 
 
191
  See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
73–104 (1980) (arguing that judicial review should be used in cases where the democratic process has 
failed). 
192
  See Noah D. Hall, Toward a *ew Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water Management in the 
Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405, 455 (2006) (noting that representatives of industry have 
a sphere of influence in Congress). The explanation is that regulated industries have greater resources to 
lobby and otherwise influence government, and they suffer less from collective action problems than the 
general public. 
193
  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992) (“[If] the plaintiff is himself an 
object of the action (or forgone action) at issue . . . there is ordinarily little question that the action or 
inaction has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it.”). 
194
  Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering *egotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on the 
Effectiveness of *egotiation Style, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 143, 147 (2002) (noting a prelitigation 
settlement rate of 95%); see also ALAN SCOTT RAU, EDWARD F. SHERMAN & SCOTT PEPPET, 
PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 13–21 (4th ed. 2006) (noting an 
empirical study that lists trial rates for certain areas of law, such as civil cases and prisoners suits, which 
range from 0.9% to 3.7%). 
195
  This is the theory underlying class actions: individuals will not bring suit because the costs of 
the litigation outweigh the expected rewards. John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: 
The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative 
Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 685 (1986). 
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of public-law challenges brought by an individual, the individual plaintiff 
himself did not seek to bring suit; instead, an interest group wishing to 
pursue the litigation found an individual with standing and encouraged that 
individual to bring suit.196 Indeed, given the size of our population, current 
standing doctrine poses no real impediment to litigation to those who wish 
to bring suit.197 Thus, expanding standing may not have any real effect on 
the size of the federal docket. 
In addition, although more people would have standing under the any-
risk-of-harm standard, many will nevertheless be discouraged from bringing 
suit because courts are likely to dismiss their cases on the merits. One 
reason why courts currently do not face a large number of cases alleging 
small risks of harm: plaintiffs undoubtedly do not bring such suits because 
they expect that their suits will be dismissed for lack of standing.198 Similar 
reasoning extends to the merits. The standards for awarding prospective 
relief often pose obstacles for those facing only small risks of harm. To 
obtain an injunction, for example, a plaintiff must demonstrate not only that 
the law prohibits the defendant’s conduct, but also that the plaintiff faces a 
likelihood of suffering irreparable harm if relief is not immediately 
granted.199 Similarly, courts have discretion whether to grant declaratory 
relief, and one of the considerations relevant to the exercise of that 
discretion is the likelihood that the plaintiff will suffer harm if relief is 
withheld.200 A substantive standard itself might also preclude claims based 
on low-probability risks. A challenge to legislation evaluated under the 
rational basis test, for example, is likely to fail if the basis for the plaintiff’s 
challenge is that the legislation poses a potential, but small, risk, because 
 
196
  In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), for example, the Cato Institute sought 
out the plaintiffs to bring suit challenging the handgun restrictions in the District of Columbia. See 
Supreme Court Overturns D.C. Gun Ban; What *ext?, NPR NEWS & NOTES (Jul. 3, 2008), http://pd.npr.
org/anon.npr-mp3/npr/newsnotes/2008/07/20080703_newsnotes_01.mp3. 
197
  See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 
1305 (1976) (“[I]t is never hard to find [a] . . . plaintiff to raise the issues.”); Mark Tushnet, “Meet the 
*ew Boss”: The *ew Judicial Center, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1205, 1213 (2005) (stating that current standing 
doctrine “will rarely impede a well-advised litigant seeking to challenge almost any statute enacted by 
Congress or action taken by an executive official”). 
198
  Cf. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 904 (2008) (rejecting arguments that the potential for many 
suits requires a more stringent doctrine of res judicata, because, even if res judicata does not apply, there 
is a “human tendency not to waste money” that “deter[s] the bringing of suits” that are bound to lose 
(quoting DAVID L. SHAPIRO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRECLUSION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 97 (2001))).  
199
  See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2760 (2010) (noting that a court 
may award an injunction only “to guard against any present or imminent risk of likely irreparable 
harm”); Bokulich v. Jury Comm’n of Greene Cnty., 394 U.S. 97, 99 (1969) (holding that injunctions are 
appropriate only “to prevent irreparable injury which is clear and imminent” (quoting Douglas v. City of 
Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943) (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
200
  See, e.g., Fieger v. Mich. Sup. Ct., 553 F.3d 955, 974 (6th Cir. 2009) (vacating declaratory 
judgment because of lack of imminent harm); El Dia, Inc. v. Hernandez Colon, 963 F.2d 488, 498 (1st 
Cir. 1992) (reversing grant of declaratory judgment when the plaintiff failed to demonstrate high 
likelihood of harm). 
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the legislature could rationally conclude that the benefits of the legislation 
offset the small risks it creates.201 Because courts are unlikely to award 
prospective relief for small risks of harm, plaintiffs are bound to be less 
likely to bring suit. 
In any event, to the extent that the federal judiciary faces the need to 
reduce its caseload, it can more effectively and transparently accomplish 
that goal through the prudential doctrines discussed in the next section. 
IV. A PRUDENTIAL APPROACH 
What should be apparent by now is that Article III should extend to all 
claims in which a plaintiff challenges conduct that increases the threat of a 
future injury so long as a court order would remove that increase in risk. 
Doing so would make better sense of the text of Article III, simplify the law 
of standing, and improve the legitimacy of standing determinations. 
Still, there is reason to resist expanding Article III standing in this way. 
After all, the minimum-risk requirement is not worthless. Although not 
compelled by Article III, it arguably helps to avoid unnecessary judicial 
interference with the political branches, preserves judicial resources by 
limiting the number of potential plaintiffs, and promotes better 
decisionmaking by ensuring that interested parties—the ones who are in the 
best position to make strong arguments—are the ones who make it into 
court. 
For this reason, courts should develop prudential rules limiting 
standing in cases alleging small risks of injury. Although Article III 
authorizes federal courts to hear those claims, these prudential doctrines 
would allow courts to decline to hear some of those suits. Allowing courts 
to decline jurisdiction in these cases would hardly be unprecedented. Courts 
have long recognized prudential limitations on standing202—for example, 
courts have created prudential doctrines limiting standing for plaintiffs 
asserting the rights of third parties203—that allow them to decline 
jurisdiction because of concerns about the potential negative consequences 
of exercising jurisdiction.204 
Under this proposed prudential test, a court would determine whether 
to hear a claim alleging a low risk of injury based on a number of factors, 
such as the plaintiff’s interest in having the case heard, the risk to 
 
201
  See, e.g., Britell v. United States, 372 F.3d 1370, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (rejecting challenge to 
abortion funding ban despite increase in health risk for some mothers). 
202
  See Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 298–90 (2008) (Roberts, C. J., 
dissenting) (identifying various prudential forms of standing); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 
542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004); see generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER 
& DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S: THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 170 
(6th ed. 2009) (summarizing this area of law). 
203
  Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129–30 (2004). 
204
  See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 580–85 (1985). 
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separation of powers or federalism, and the amount of information available 
to the court to render decision. Needless to say, courts should be more 
willing to intervene when the plaintiff has a significant interest at stake and 
less so when judicial intervention threatens separation of powers or 
federalism, or when there is insufficient information for a court to render an 
intelligent decision.205 
As suggested earlier, there is reason to think that courts already often 
base standing decisions on these considerations.206 But this prudential test 
would require courts to consider these factors explicitly, instead of 
implicitly in a minimum-risk test. Explicit discussion of these 
considerations would promote judicial legitimacy by increasing 
transparency in decisionmaking.207 It would also lead to a more coherent 
law of standing because it would facilitate better understanding among the 
lower courts for the superior courts’ decisions. Likewise, explicit discussion 
would foster better decisionmaking not only by enabling parties to offer 
arguments actually tailored to the court’s concerns, but also by forcing 
judges to engage in the process of articulating the factors underlying their 
decision whether to exercise jurisdiction.208 
What follows is a discussion of several factors that courts should 
consider in determining whether to exercise jurisdiction over a claim 
asserting a small risk of injury. Some of these considerations point in favor 
of the exercise of jurisdiction and others counsel against that exercise. 
Although the list is not exhaustive, it illustrates the kinds of matters courts 
should consider in determining whether to exercise jurisdiction. 
A. *ature of the Violation 
Courts should be more willing to intervene when the plaintiff’s interest 
at stake is significant. The plaintiff’s interest depends on both the severity 
of the threatened harm and the likelihood that the injury will occur. When 
the threatened harm is substantial, courts should be more willing to 
 
205
  Others have proposed prudential doctrines of abstention to replace standing. See Elliott, supra 
note 174, at 508; Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARV. L. REV. 
255, 304–05 (1961); Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. 
REV. 1265, 1296 (1961); Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 129–38 
(2007); Mark V. Tushnet, The *ew Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 
663, 700 (1977). This Article expands on those prudential tests by adding consideration of the plaintiff’s 
interest. 
206
  See supra notes 110–13 and accompanying text. 
207
  See F. Andrew Hessick & Samuel P. Jordan, Setting the Size of the Supreme Court, 41 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 645, 661 (2009) (“Transparency further promotes legitimacy by providing the public with greater 
access to the decision-making process to satisfy itself of the Court’s candor.”). 
208
  See Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1375 (1995) (noting how the drafting process forces judges to confront the 
case and often leads judges to “modulate, transfer, or even switch an originally intended rationale or 
result”). 
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intervene despite a low probability of that harm occurring. For example, 
when death is the threatened harm, the required risk should be relatively 
low. By contrast, when the threatened harm is less significant—such as the 
possibility that a person’s yard will be exposed to a benign fungus—the 
required probability should be higher. 
There are two reasons why courts should be more willing to exercise 
jurisdiction for serious harms. The first is moral. There is a sense that 
society should prevent harm when doing so would not entail substantial 
burdens.209 By this logic, the greater the threatened harm, the stronger the 
obligation to prevent that harm. Thus, when a particularly important interest 
is at stake, courts should more readily exercise jurisdiction. Second, 
consideration of the nature of the harm allows courts to allocate judicial 
resources more efficiently. Courts do not have the resources to address all 
potential injuries.210 They accordingly should devote judicial resources to 
those harms that pose the highest cost to society. 
In addition to the gravity of the factual harm that plaintiffs might 
suffer, the consideration of whether to exercise jurisdiction should include 
the nature of the rights that might be violated.211 Courts should be more 
willing to exercise jurisdiction when important rights are at stake.212 The 
role of the court is to protect rights.213 That role becomes more essential as 
 
209
  Joel Feinberg, The Moral and Legal Responsibility of the Bad Samaritan, 3 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 
56, 67 (1984) (“[W]here minimal effort is required to prevent harm, the moral duty to prevent it seems 
every bit as stringent as the negative duty not to inflict that same harm directly.”); William W. Fisher & 
Talha Syed, Global Justice in Healthcare: Developing Drugs for the Developing World, 40 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 581, 649 (2007) (noting the “positive moral duty to prevent severe harm or to alleviate severe 
suffering that is within one’s sphere of influence”). 
210
  See, e.g., Robert L. Pushaw, Jr., Limiting Article III Standing to “Accidental” Plaintiffs: Lessons 
from Environmental and Animal Law Cases, 45 GA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010) (“[S]tanding improves 
efficiency by allocating scarce judicial resources to the most pressing cases.”).  
211
  It is unclear whether the violation of a legal right is essential for standing. Some decisions 
suggest that standing requires both that the plaintiff has suffered a factual harm and that the harm be the 
consequence of a violation of a right. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997) (noting that, for 
standing, the injury must involve “an invasion of a legally protected interest” (quoting Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Other decisions 
suggest that factual harm alone will support standing. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 160, 166 
(1997) (granting standing based solely on the fact that the plaintiffs would suffer the adverse 
consequence of less water without mention of riparian rights); Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. 
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152–54 (1970) (basing standing on an economic injury without regard to any legal 
interest). 
212
  The Supreme Court has claimed that there is no hierarchy of constitutional rights. See Valley 
Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982). 
But the Court itself has created a hierarchy in its decisions about incorporation by distinguishing 
between fundamental and nonfundamental constitutional rights and the levels of scrutiny to apply. 
Similarly, the exceptions to general doctrines that the Court has recognized for some rights—such as the 
overbreadth doctrine for First Amendment challenges—suggest that the Court deems certain rights more 
important. In any event, one may easily draw a line between constitutional and nonconstitutional when 
determining the importance of rights. 
213
  Hessick, supra note 17, at 325. 
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the importance of the right increases. Thus, courts should be more willing 
to find standing for claims alleging potential violations of rights that we 
deem fundamental, such as the right to a petit jury in a criminal case,214 than 
for rights that are not fundamental, such as the right to make peremptory 
challenges to potential jurors.215 Similarly, insofar as one of the principal 
functions of the judiciary is to protect the rights of the minority who cannot 
rely on the political process, courts should be particularly solicitous of 
claims against the government seeking to enforce rights necessary to 
participate in the political process.216 
Several cases endorse this approach.217 For example, to have standing 
to challenge a criminal law outlawing conduct in which the plaintiff wishes 
to engage, the plaintiff usually must show that he faces a threat of 
prosecution if he engages in the activity.218 But in the First Amendment 
context, courts have dispensed with that showing. All the plaintiff must 
show is that the law targets the conduct that the plaintiff wishes to 
undertake.219 Similarly, courts appear to have relaxed the standing 
requirement in cases involving the right to abortion. In Doe v. Bolton, the 
Court held that doctors had standing to challenge criminal abortion statutes, 
“despite the fact that the record does not disclose that any one of [the 
doctors] has been prosecuted, or threatened with prosecution.”220 
 
214
  See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (“[T]rial by jury in criminal cases is 
fundamental to the American scheme of justice . . . .”). 
215
  See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57 (1992) (“[P]eremptory challenges are not 
constitutionally protected fundamental rights; rather, they are but one state-created means to the 
constitutional end of an impartial jury and a fair trial.”). 
216
  ELY, supra note 191, at 73–104 (arguing that judicial review should be used in cases where the 
democratic process has failed). 
217
  13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 3532.5, at 551–72 (3d ed. 2008) (“As often happens with questions of justiciability, 
results are shaped by an often unarticulated sense of the importance of the rights claimed and by an 
uncertain pragmatic assessment of the reality of the plaintiff’s claimed need for guidance.”). 
218
  E.g., Mink v. Suthers, 482 F.3d 1244, 1257 (10th Cir. 2007) (dismissing challenge to criminal 
statute for lack of standing because plaintiff faced “no credible threat of prosecution”); Reed v. 
Giarrusso, 462 F.2d 706, 710–11 (5th Cir. 1972). 
219
  Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 392–93 (1988) (“That requirement is met 
here, as the law is aimed directly at plaintiffs, who, if their interpretation of the statute is correct, will 
have to take significant and costly compliance measures or risk criminal prosecution . . . . Further, the 
alleged danger of this statute is, in large measure, one of self-censorship; a harm that can be realized 
even without an actual prosecution.”); see also, e.g., Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, 328 F.3d 
1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2003); Majors v. Abell, 317 F.3d 719, 721 (7th Cir. 2003) (“But if it arguably 
covers it, and so may deter constitutionally protected expression because most people are frightened of 
violating criminal statutes especially when the gains are slight, as they would be for people seeking only 
to make a political point and not themselves political operatives, there is standing.”), certifying questions 
to 792 N.E.2d 22 (Ind. 2003); cf. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) (no standing where the law does 
not target the chilled activity). 
220
  410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973). 
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To be sure, these decisions have approached the standing issue in terms 
of Article III, not prudential, standing: they have concluded that the more 
important the right, the more likely a dispute presents a case or controversy 
under Article III. But it is far more sensible to frame the issue as one of 
prudential standing. Whether a dispute constitutes a case or controversy 
should not vary with the right. A case is a dispute subject to judicial 
resolution, and whether a court can resolve a dispute does not depend on 
which right is at stake; rather, it depends on whether the right, whatever it 
may be, has been or will be violated.221 By contrast, treating the importance 
of the right as a prudential consideration allows courts to exercise discretion 
in exercising jurisdiction. 
B. Comity 
Although concerns about separation of powers do not warrant 
interpreting Article III to exclude all low-probability threats of harm, 
comity—that is, the desire to avoid conflict with state governments and the 
other branches of the federal government222—might justify a court’s refusal 
to hear some of those claims.223 Comity routinely informs courts’ decisions 
about whether to exercise jurisdiction.224 These same concerns should 
inform courts’ decisions whether to intervene in cases alleging low-risk 
injuries. 
Comity concerns are most significant when resolving a claim would 
require a court to interfere with the function of another branch. Take, for 
example, a claim asking a court to pass on the constitutionality of 
legislative enactments. Declaring a statute unconstitutional directly 
conflicts with the legislature’s task of implementing policy through 
legislation. It also signifies disrespect of the legislature’s constitutional 
judgment because legislative enactment implicitly carries the legislature’s 
determination that the law is constitutional.225 When a claim alleging a low 




  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (“[W]here there is a legal right, 
there is also a legal remedy[,] by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded.” (quoting 3 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23) (internal quotation mark omitted)).  
222
  See Turner Entm’t Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1519 n.10 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting 
commentators have defined comity using terms such as “courtesy, politeness, convenience or goodwill” 
(quoting Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 3 (1991))). 
223
  Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 2323, 2336 (2010) (“Comity . . . is a prudential 
doctrine.”). 
224
  See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (invoking comity in abstaining from ruling 
on legality of state criminal proceedings); Wright v. Associated Ins. Cos., 29 F.3d 1244, 1252 (7th Cir. 
1994) (noting comity as consideration in determining whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction). 
225
  See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000); F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the 
Presumption of Constitutionality, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1447, 1462–63 (2010). 
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Comity also counsels that courts should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction 
in suits that seek the imposition of expensive or intrusive remedies on the 
government. As Professor Fallon has explained, courts should avoid such 
suits because of the costs to the government in conforming to court rulings 
and because they involve the courts in the business of dictating policy to the 
political branches.226 A corollary of that theory is that the judiciary should 
be especially reluctant to award expensive or intrusive relief when the need 
for that award is low.227 In such situations, the benefits of that award are 
uncertain, but the costs are certain. 
Indeed, as noted earlier, these concerns likely already play a role, albeit 
an unmentioned one, in many of the Court’s standing decisions.228 They 
explain better than current doctrine why the Court is willing to recognize 
standing for some risks of harm but not others. But the way that the Court 
has considered comity in these decisions is through Article III; when the 
requested remedy may intrude too much on the other branches, the Court 
has said that the claim does not present an Article III case or controversy.229 
But the cost to the government is irrelevant to whether a dispute constitutes 
a case over which a court has the power to exercise jurisdiction. Whether a 
dispute constitutes a case depends on whether that dispute involves the 
violation of rights for which the court can provide a remedy.230 The concern 
about interfering with the other branches bears on whether a court should 
exercise jurisdiction over an actual dispute, not whether it may. Thus, 
comity should be a factor bearing not on whether a court has Article III 
jurisdiction, but on whether the court should exercise that jurisdiction.231 
C. Imminence 
The imminence of an injury should also factor into a court’s decision 
whether to hear a case. As noted earlier, the Court has said that the 
imminence requirement is relevant to justiciability only to the extent that it 
 
226
  Fallon, supra note 7, at 648 (developing thesis that jurisdiction doctrines reflect concerns about 
remedies). 
227
  Cf. Hessick, supra note 17, at 312 (arguing that the judiciary may be reluctant to award relief 
when the “plaintiff would not materially benefit from a favorable decision”). 
228
  See supra notes 111–13 and accompanying text; see also Fallon, supra note 7, at 649–52 
(gathering cases tending to show that jurisdiction doctrines reflect concerns about remedies). 
229
  See supra notes 111–13 and accompanying text. 
230
  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
231
  Alexander Bickel usefully described this concept in terms of political capital. ALEXANDER M. 
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 116 (2d ed. 
1986). Judicial decisions against other branches have effect only if those branches acquiesce in those 
decisions. Id. Refusing to exercise jurisdiction allows the courts to avoid spending political capital on 
particularly sensitive issues. Id. At the same time, however, courts may also expend capital by refusing 
to hear cases that the other branches believe should be heard. Id. 
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bears on whether a threat of injury is realistic.232 But imminence may serve 
other roles. An imminence requirement may promote private resolution of 
claims. Consider the situation where one individual presents a nonimminent 
threat of injury to another individual. Because the harm is not imminent, the 
individuals have time to try to resolve their dispute without judicial 
intervention. Private resolution of claims would preserve judicial resources 
and arguably could lead to more efficient outcomes.233 
Requiring imminence of an injury also may promote comity. Even 
when a remote harm is inevitable, another government body may still have 
an opportunity to remedy that harm if the harm is not imminent. In that 
situation, courts should be reluctant to intervene. This approach is 
consistent with a variety of other prudential doctrines, such as exhaustion234 
and abstention,235 which rest in part on this notion that courts should not 
intervene when other bodies of government may redress the challenged 
wrong. 
Under this approach, courts should decline jurisdiction for 
nonimminent harms, irrespective of whether the harm will inevitably occur 
under the status quo, if another government body may provide relief. For 
example, suppose a state university has an affirmative action program that 
imposes an unconstitutional quota for admission, and that a five-year-old 
white child seeks to challenge that program. Because he has a stake in that 
claim, the child has Article III standing. But there is good reason for the 
courts to refuse to exercise jurisdiction. That is because the child is not yet 
in a position to apply to college, and in the next thirteen years, the political 
branches may abolish the affirmative action program.236 If they do not, the 
child can turn to the courts at that time. 
 
232
  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565, n.2 (“Although ‘imminence’ is concededly a 
somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged 
injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is ‘certainly impending[]’ . . . .” 
(quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990))). 
233
  Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2079–81 
(2005). 
234
  Courts require plaintiffs to exhaust their remedies before administrative agencies before 
proceeding to court because it “giv[es] agencies the opportunity to correct their own errors, afford[s] 
parties and courts the benefits of agencies’ expertise, [and] compil[es] a record adequate for judicial 
review[.]” Avocados Plus Inc. v. Veneman, 370 F.3d 1243, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (third and fifth 
alterations in original) (quoting Marine Mammal Conservancy, Inc. v. Dep’t of Agric., 134 F.3d 409, 
414 (D.C. Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts may excuse exhaustion when requiring 
the parties to exhaust their administrative remedies would not fulfill these goals. Id. 
235
  Federal courts will abstain from ruling on the constitutionality of a state criminal statute at the 
instigation of a plaintiff who is being prosecuted under that law because state officers have the principal 
duty of implementing the state’s laws. See Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243–44 (1926). 
236
  This concern underlies the Supreme Court’s decision in Lujan. There, as noted earlier, the Court 
denied standing for a person who asserted intent to travel to Sri Lanka to view endangered animals 
because the person did not specify that his trip to Sri Lanka was imminent. Lujan, 497 U.S. at 564. One 
reason the Court gave for dismissing the case was that recognizing standing would interfere with the 
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Applying this prudential approach would have led to a much more 
nuanced decision in Massachusetts v. EPA.237 There, the Court found 
standing for Massachusetts, which had challenged the EPA’s refusal to 
issue a rule regulating emissions, based on the threat of loss of land from 
rising sea levels due to global warming.238 Although acknowledging that the 
harm would not occur for several decades, the Court explained that the 
probability of harm without regulation of emissions was certain.239 But that 
reasoning is too simplistic. The eventual certainty of harm is not 
automatically a sufficient reason for the courts to intervene. Even if the 
threat of harm under the current legal regime was certain, it was not certain 
that regulations had to be enacted immediately to prevent those harms. The 
political branches thus may have had adequate time to change the law to 
redress the problem, in which case comity counseled against immediate 
judicial intervention. 
On the other hand, although it was not clear that immediate 
intervention was necessary to prevent the future harm, one might argue that 
the interest at stake—the possible destruction of the coastline—was too 
large for the federal courts to abstain. These considerations should have 
informed the Court’s decision whether the exercise of federal jurisdiction 
was appropriate.240 A balance of these considerations may suggest that the 
Court did come to the correct conclusion in finding standing, but got there 
by taking the wrong path. Instead of focusing on whether there was a 
sufficient likelihood of harm to create a “case” under Article III, the Court 
should have asked whether the exercise of jurisdiction was appropriate. 
D. Functional Concerns 
In cases alleging a small risk of harm, courts should also consider 
whether exercising jurisdiction is particularly likely to result in lower 
 
President’s power under Article II to enforce the laws. Id. at 577. But this argument does not raise a 
problem of low probability. Arguably, even if the probability that the plaintiff would visit Sri Lanka was 
very high—for example, if the plaintiff had stated that returning to Sri Lanka was his principal goal in 
life—the Court would have hesitated to grant standing because it would result in premature judicial 
intervention into matters reserved to the President. 
Courts should not intervene without evidence that the political branches did not have adequate time 
to determine whether to take action and what course to take. Indeed, Professor Nash himself notes that 
there should be severe limits on the doctrine because of separation-of-powers concerns of these sorts. 
See Nash, supra note 7, at 522. 
237
  549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
238
  Id. at 514. 
239
  Id. at 523. 
240
  Of course, Congress or the EPA could refuse to take additional action to deal with global 
warming. In that situation, a court could exercise jurisdiction over a future claim challenging the EPA’s 
failure to develop regulations combating global warming. But the fact that Congress and the EPA 
refused to take any additional action in the meantime may reflect Congress’s intent not to create 
regulations targeting global warming and thus lead the court not to grant relief. 
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quality decisions. Under our adversarial system, courts depend in large part 
on the parties in resolving cases. The burden is on the parties to make 
arguments and gather factual information relevant to deciding the case. 
Ordinarily, the size of a plaintiff’s stake in a case is directly related to his 
incentives to litigate effectively: the greater the stake, the more forceful the 
litigation, and consequently the more aid that the plaintiff is likely to 
provide the court in reaching its decision.241 Courts accordingly should be 
more hesitant to exercise jurisdiction in a case in which the plaintiff has 
only a small stake because he faces only a minute risk of injury. But courts 
should not automatically deny standing in those cases. That is because the 
size of the stake does not necessarily determine the forcefulness of a 
plaintiff’s argument. An interest group seeking to enforce a principle 
through litigation may pursue claims more vigorously than an individual 
who actually suffers the type of harm that the interest group seeks to 
prevent.242 That is because, although the group may not suffer injury, it 
nevertheless has a strong interest in the way in which the case is resolved. 
That said, it stands to reason that a person with a small stake in a case is 
less likely to litigate a claim as forcefully as someone with a substantial 
stake. 
Small risks of injury may also undermine the quality of 
decisionmaking by requiring courts to decide issues with an inadequate set 
of facts. One reason for the injury-in-fact requirement is that it provides 
factual context for a court’s decision, thereby increasing the chance of a 
sound decision by making the court aware of the impact of its decision.243 A 
claim based on a small threat of a future injury might provide inadequate 
context for a decision if the reason for the low probability of harm is that 
there is a possibility of intervening events that will change how the injury 
will occur or the precise nature of the injury. These types of uncertainty 
about an injury make it difficult for a court to tailor its decision to remedy 
the harm in the least intrusive way. 
 
241
  Hessick, supra note 17, at 321; see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (stating that the 
parties seeking to invoke the court’s jurisdiction must have “alleged such a personal stake in the 
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of 
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions”). 
242
  See Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 266 n.251 (1990); David M. 
Driesen, Standing for *othing: The Paradox of Demanding Concrete Context for Formalist 
Adjudication, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 808, 819 & n.77 (2004). 
243
  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: *otes on the 
Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 14 (1984); Hessick, supra note 17, at 321; Gene R. 
Nichol, Jr., Injury and the Disintegration of Article III, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1915, 1927 (1986) 
(“Examination of these effects serves to fine tune the judicial decisionmaking process since abstract 
rulings based on hypothetical impacts are more apt to be unwise ones.”); see also Valley Forge Christian 
Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (noting that the 
judicial standard for establishing standing “tends to assure that the legal questions presented to the court 
will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context 
conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.”). 
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Of course, not all low-probability injuries are attributable to changing 
circumstances that may affect how a court writes its decision. An injury 
may have a low probability of occurring, not because of potential 
intervening events that affect the nature of the injury, but simply because it 
is unlikely that the event will occur. An example is rolling a one on a 
hundred-sided die. In that circumstance, the low probability of rolling a one 
is not attributable to some potential intervening circumstances; it is simply 
that there are many other possible outcomes. When the low probability of 
injury is not due to an intervening event, the low probability does not affect 
the court’s ability to predict the factual context of the injury. Consequently, 
courts should be more willing to exercise jurisdiction. But when the reason 
for the low probability of injury might affect the nature of the injury, courts 
should be more hesitant. 
A related problem arises when there is uncertainty about probability 
itself. Unknown probability might have a significant impact on the quality 
of decisionmaking. When the risk of injury is unknown, the judiciary may 
not be able to assess intelligently the effects of awarding relief or the need 
to adopt a doctrine preventing similar future threats.244 For example, if it is 
uncertain whether a tire manufacturer’s conduct raises the risk of blowouts 
and accidents, a court cannot rationally assess whether to adopt a rule 
prohibiting that conduct. The uncertainty of the harm prevents the court 
from knowing whether the prohibition is worth the costs it would impose on 
the manufacturer.245 
Of course, courts should not dismiss out of hand claims alleging 
uncertain risks of harm. If a court knows that the probability of harm is high 
but simply does not know how high, the court should exercise jurisdiction 
 
244
  To be sure, this uncertainty does not pose a direct problem in all cases in which it occurs. The 
merits of most administrative law cases do not depend on the injury forming the basis for standing. See 
Driesen, supra note 242, at 820 (illustrating this point through examples). But even in those cases, the 
facts may present equitable concerns that influence the development of doctrine. See generally Frederick 
Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883 (2006) (arguing that the facts of a case 
influence legal development). 
245
  The Court’s decisions occasionally reflect this concern. See, e.g., Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 
321–22 (1991) (finding unripe a challenge to a state law prohibiting political party endorsements for 
nonpartisan office on the ground that the political parties had not alleged an intent to endorse a particular 
candidate, and had not described “the nature of the endorsement, how it would be publicized, or the 
precise language” that would be forbidden). Uncertainty of this sort often occurs in facial challenges to 
statutes. Generally, a law is facially invalid only if there are no possible constitutional applications of the 
law. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). It is often not obvious whether a law has a 
potential constitutional application before a case arises presenting that constitutional application. For 
this reason, courts have dismissed facial challenges on the ground that they are not ripe. See Nat’l Park 
Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 810–11 (2003) (rejecting facial challenge to 
regulation as unripe because regulation might have legal application in some cases). But cf. Nathaniel 
Persily, Fig Leaves and Tea Leaves in the Supreme Court’s Recent Election Law Decisions, 2008 SUP. 
CT. REV. 89, 96 (arguing that in some cases the Court has “conflat[ed] the as-applied/facial doctrine 
with doctrines of ripeness” by upholding laws against facial challenges on the ground that “the true 
extent of the constitutional burden remained unknown at the time of the litigation”). 
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to award relief (if warranted on the merits) and fashion a doctrine to prevent 
that injury.246 
A separate pragmatic concern arising from extending standing to small 
risks of injury is that the potential increase in caseload threatens to reduce 
the quality of decisions and distract courts from considering the claims of 
those individuals who most need relief. As noted earlier, there is reason to 
think that the federal docket would not substantially grow under the any-
risk-of-harm standard.247 But if the dockets did grow, courts could 
ameliorate the burden by confining jurisdiction to claims with a more 
pressing need for resolution based on the prudential considerations 
identified earlier. Doing so would allocate judicial resources to resolving 
claims of individuals presenting the greatest need for relief. But this does 
not mean that courts should never exercise jurisdiction for remote threats of 
injury. Jurisdiction might be warranted if the threatened harm is extremely 
severe, even if its risk of occurring is small or if the risk of harm is widely 
shared and recurrent. In those situations, a decision would produce 
substantial benefits warranting the use of judicial resources.248 
CONCLUSION 
The constitutionalization of the minimum-risk requirement for 
jurisdiction confuses what courts ought not to do with what they cannot do. 
Despite the Supreme Court’s protestations to the contrary, the size of the 
likelihood of a threat occurring does not determine whether that threat 
presents a case or controversy. Any potential threat of injury that the courts 
can remedy creates a justiciable controversy and thus is sufficient to support 
Article III standing. 
To be sure, expanding Article III standing to plaintiffs who allege 
small risks might not ultimately change many outcomes because those 
plaintiffs are likely to lose on the merits of the claims.249 But that does not 
mean that the current doctrine should be preserved. For one thing, the 
minimum-risk requirement unjustifiably limits the power of the legislature 
by shifting to the courts the constitutional authority to determine whether a 
particular claim warrants judicial intervention. For another, the minimum-
risk requirement threatens to muddle standing because of the imprecise 
standards and insufficient information that courts employ in making risk 
assessments. The result is an appearance that courts make standing 
 
246
  At least one court has dealt with uncertainty of injury simply by saying the uncertain increase in 
risk did suffice for standing. See N.Y. Pub. Interest Research Grp. v. Whitman, 321 F.3d 316, 326 (2d 
Cir. 2003) (finding standing based on uncertain increase in risk from pollution emissions). 
247
  See supra notes 194–98 and accompanying text. 
248
  Of course, Congress should have the power to override these concerns, given that it has 
traditionally been the role of Congress and not the courts to determine the appropriate allocation of 
judicial resources. 
249
  See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
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decisions based on personal biases or considerations other than merely the 
size of risk.250 
This is not to say that courts must exercise jurisdiction over all 
individuals seeking redress for small risks of injury. One can justify 
creating a framework under which courts have discretion to decline 
jurisdiction in cases alleging a small risk of injury. But courts should 
articulate their reasons for doing so by using more refined tools that 
explicitly allow them to balance these concerns on a case-by-case basis 
instead of relying on a blanket rule that the Constitution forbids the 
adjudication of such claims. Doing so would promote transparency by 
making explicit the fact that courts do often make standing determinations 
based on these considerations. And it would facilitate a more coherent and 
predictable law of standing, which would benefit litigants and all three 




  Cf. Tushnet, supra note 205, at 663 (arguing that standing determinations often reflect views 
about the merits). 
